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HOW THE RISE OF BIG DATA AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS ARE 
CHANGING THE ATTORNEY’S DUTY OF COMPETENCE 
 
Peter Segrist* 
 
If the legal profession had been able to foresee in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, prior to the meteoric rise and ensuing 
cultural ubiquity of social media, that every tagged spring break 
photo, 2:00 a.m. status update, and furious wall post would one 
day be vulnerable to potential exposure in the cold, unforgiving 
light of civil and criminal litigation, attorneys would have been 
well-advised to discuss the ramifications of such actions, 
statements, and disclosures with their clients. Today, a similar 
phenomenon is looming in the form of the collection, aggregation, 
analysis and sale of personal data, and it will be the prudent 
attorney who competently advises his clients to stay ahead of the 
curve.  
From the standpoint of attorney competency, the emergence of 
the Internet has forced attorneys to confront unique and complex 
ethical problems in terms of advising clients as to which types of 
Internet activity may be off limits or ill-advised. The recent ethics 
opinions of several bar associations demonstrate how 
technological advances are effectively shaping the duty of 
competence, concluding that an attorney’s duty of competence may 
include an obligation to advise clients regarding their posts to 
social media. Contemporaneously, the data broker industry has 
rapidly expanded into the digital sphere, daily collecting huge 
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swaths of consumers’ personal information. That information is 
now legally exchanged between entities for value, and 
sophisticated analytical tools have been developed that permit data 
holders to make meaningful, highly accurate and highly personal 
deductions and predictions from high volume, seemingly chaotic, 
datasets. This Article argues that the same rationale that supports 
the notion that attorneys should advise clients against 
irresponsible social media usage also supports the finding that, 
given the current lack of regulation on the collection, 
commoditization, aggregation and analysis of consumer data, 
there is an emerging ethical obligation to advise clients regarding 
the responsible, and, ideally, anonymous, use of the Internet.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
[T]he intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and 
man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive 
to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to 
the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through 
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, 
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.1 
The creation of the Internet has forced attorneys to confront 
complex ethical problems when advising clients on appropriate 
Internet activity. Recent ethics opinions from several bar 
associations have concluded that an attorney’s duty of competency 
extends to advising clients regarding their posts to social media, 
subject to substantive rules regarding spoliation, due to the huge 
potential impact that such postings can have on a client’s position 
in both potential and ongoing litigation.2 Activities on social media, 
general Internet browsing, and myriad other everyday activities 
now generate tremendous amounts of seemingly innocuous personal 
data.3 Contemporaneously, the data broker industry, which has 
essentially commoditized information associated with the 
                                                
1 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 196 (1890).  
2 See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Social Media Ethics Guidelines (2014), 
https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Commercial_Federal_Litigation/Com_Fed_PDFs/ 
Social_Media_Ethics_Guidelines.html [hereinafter NYSBA Opinion]; Phila. Bar 
Ass’n, Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2014-5, at 4–5 (2014), available at 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/Opinions2010Present?appNum=4 [hereinafter 
PBA Opinion] (discussing discovery concerns related to social media); N.Y. 
Cnty. Lawyers Ass’n, Op. 745 (2013), available at http://www.nycla.org/ 
siteFiles/Publications/Publications1630_0.pdf [hereinafter NYCLA Opinion] 
(discussing advising a client regarding posts on social media sites); Pa. Bar 
Ass’n, Formal Opinion 2014-300, available at https://www.pabar.org/members/ 
catalogs/Ethics%20Opinions/formal/F2014-300.pdf#search=%222014-300%22 
[hereinafter Penn. Opinion] (discussing ethical obligations for attorney using 
social media); N.C. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Ethics Op. 5 (2014) [hereinafter 
NCB Opinion], http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?page= 5&from=7/2014; 
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt. 8 (placing an affirmative 
duty upon attorneys to stay abreast of technological developments relevant to 
the practice of law as part of their competency obligation). 
3 See generally infra Part II (discussing private sector data collection practices). 
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individual, has rapidly expanded into the digital sphere, collecting 
huge swaths of consumers’ personal information daily. This 
information is now legally exchanged between entities for value, 
and sophisticated analytical tools have been developed that permit 
data holders to make meaningful, highly accurate, and highly 
personal deductions and predictions from high volume, seemingly 
chaotic, datasets. Given the current lack of regulation on the 
collection, commoditization, aggregation, and analysis of 
consumer data, this Article argues that the same rationale that 
supports the notion that attorneys should advise clients against 
irresponsible social media usage also supports the finding that 
there is an emerging ethical obligation to advise clients regarding 
the responsible and, ideally, anonymous Internet use.  
Since the first censuses were conducted and crop yields 
recorded in the ancient world, data collection and analysis have 
been crucial components of a wide array of societal and 
technological improvements.4 Today, data storage and processing 
costs are plummeting, while data collection methods are increasing.  
Simultaneously, increases in the number and variety of 
data-producing devices—sensor technologies, GPS trackers, and 
the so-called “Internet of things,”5—as well as the number of 
individuals connected to the Internet, have given rise to a situation 
wherein the amount of data presently available to both 
governments and private industries to feed the machinery of 
information processing analysis, with regards to either an entire 
population, or a single individual, has become unimaginably huge.6   
                                                
4 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, 
PRESERVING VALUES 1 (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf [hereinafter WHITE 
HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT]; see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 21 (2014) [hereinafter CUKIER BIG DATA] 
(discussing early censuses and associated problems). 
5 See infra notes 61–69, and accompanying text, describing the Internet of 
things as the sum of all devices connected to the Internet, such as thermostats, 
heart monitors, car insurance company driving monitors, and the like. 
6 See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (“The collection, 
storage, and analysis of data is on an upward and seemingly unbounded 
trajectory, fueled by increases in processing power, the cratering costs of 
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In the wake of these advancements, a relatively new industry 
has developed. In its recent report on Big Data, the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) defined data brokers as “companies that 
collect consumers’ personal information and resell or share that 
information with others.”7 Personal data has been commoditized, 
and is now sold and exchanged like any other good by these data 
brokers. As the practice of wide scale data collection grows, both 
private industry and governmental bodies and agencies are rapidly 
discovering that algorithmic8 analyses of vast troves of information 
empower the data holders to make staggering deductions about 
anything from where the next flu epidemic is likely to strike in the 
United States, to whether a woman is pregnant and the date of 
conception, to a person’s likelihood of committing a criminal act, 
and much more.9 This is the essence of the emerging field of 
predictive analytics wherein technological advances have created 
                                                                                                         
computation and storage, and the growing number of sensor technologies 
embedded in devices of all kinds.”); Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and 
Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 203, 253 (2013) (describing user activity in the billions at sites such as 
Google and YouTube); Amit Chowdry, Samsung, Intel and Dell Launch 
“Internet of Things” Consortium, FORBES (July 9, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/amitchowdhry/2014/07/09/samsung-intel-and-dell-launch-internet-of-things-
consortium/; CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 9 (“The amount of stored 
information grows four times faster than the world economy, while the 
processing power of computers grows nine times faster.”). 
7 FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY at i (2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-
trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
8 See Algorithm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “algorithm” 
as “[a] mathematical or logical process consisting of a series of steps, designed 
to solve a specific type of problem”). 
9 See generally infra Part III (discussing big data and predictive analytics); see 
also WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at pmbl. (“A significant 
finding of this report is that big data analytics have the potential to eclipse 
longstanding civil rights protections in how personal information is used in 
housing, credit, employment, health, education, and the marketplace.”). 
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the ability to make detailed predictions and deductions from 
gigantic, and seemingly chaotic, datasets.10   
No single technological advancement since the invention of the 
printing press has so dramatically affected nearly every aspect of 
human society as has the Internet. Its birth and development have 
resulted in dramatic and global shifts in countless professions, and 
the legal profession has not been immune to this transformation.11 
For instance, attorneys arguably have an ethical obligation to be 
able to competently navigate the Internet as part of their basic 
researching skills.12 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) now 
                                                
10 See generally infra Part III.C (discussing predictions and deductions that 
are capable of being made from large datasets). 
11 David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much about Transmitting Client Confidences 
by Internet E-mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 459 (1998) (“The Internet has 
changed American business, including the legal profession.”); James Podgers, 
Lawyers Struggle to Reconcile New Technology with Traditional Ethics Rules, 
ABA J. (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_ 
fundamentals_lawyers_struggle_to_reconcile_new_technology_with_traditio/; 
ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics 20/20, Introduction and Overview (2012), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ 
20120508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdution_and_overview_report.authchec
kdam.pdf (“[T]echnology has irrevocably changed and continues to alter the 
practice of law in fundamental ways.”); Andrew Perlman, The Twenty-First 
Century Lawyer’s Evolving Ethical Duty of Competence, 22 NO. 4 THE 
PROF. LAW. 1 (2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/ 
professional_lawyer/2014/volume-22-number-4/the_twentyfirst_century_lawyers_ 
evolving_ethical_duty_competence.html (identifying electronic discovery and 
cloud-based services as some of evolving facets of a lawyer’s duty of 
competence). 
12 See generally Lawrence D. MacLachlan, Gandy Dancers on the Web: How 
the Internet Has Raised the Bar on Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility to 
Research and Know the Law, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607 (2000); see also 
Perlman, supra note 11, at 4 (discussing Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary 
Bd. v. Wright, 840 N.W.2d 295, 301–04 (Iowa 2013), where a lawyer was 
disciplined for permitting his clients to fall for a well-known internet scam 
involving an inheritance from a distant Nigerian relative, because the lawyer 
failed to conduct a “‘cursory internet search’ that would have uncovered the 
truth,” and Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 558–59 (Mo. 2010), 
wherein the “Missouri Supreme Court recently held that lawyers should use 
‘reasonable efforts,’ including Internet-based tools, to uncover the litigation 
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routinely releases ethics opinions addressing issues such as a 
lawyer’s ability to review and research a juror’s Internet presence13 
or what is required to protect confidentiality when sending an 
unencrypted email to a client.14   
Squarely addressing such developments, the ABA recently 
added a comment to Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct modifying an attorney’s competency obligations to 
include an affirmative duty to educate him or herself as to 
technologies relevant to the practice of law.15 Addressing clients’ 
social media postings, several bar associations’ recent ethics 
opinions have noted that an attorney’s competency obligations 
under Rule 1.1 could “give rise to an obligation to advise clients, 
within legal and ethical requirements, concerning what steps to 
take to mitigate any adverse effects on the clients’ position 
emanating from the clients’ use of social media.”16 This stems from 
the simple and obvious proposition that an individual should be 
careful in allowing personal information about one’s self to be 
disseminated into the world, as that information may ultimately be 
used against its owner.  
Applying the foregoing concept to big data collection and an 
attorney’s duty to advise clients, consider the following: big data 
analytics are now capable of making increasingly personal 
deductions about individuals from large, seemingly random 
datasets and a largely unregulated for-profit industry has emerged 
for the purpose of personal data collection, commodification, 
                                                                                                         
history of jurors prior to trial in order to preserve possible objections to the 
empanelment of those jurors”). 
13 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014) 
(discussing an attorney’s ability to review a juror’s Internet “presence”). 
14 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 413 (1999); see 
generally Peter Geraghty, Cybersecurity and the Use of Emerging Technologies, 
Part 1, YOUR ABA (Dec. 2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/youraba/2014/december-2014/cybersecurity-and-the-use-of-emerging- 
technologies--part-1.html. 
15 MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt. 8. 
16 NYCLA Opinion, supra note 2; see also NYSBA Opinion, supra note 2; 
PBA Opinion, supra note 2; Penn. Opinion, supra note 2; NCB Opinion, supra 
note 2. 
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aggregation, analysis and sale.17 Moreover, anonymization of this 
data is not feasible as a long-term solution to privacy concerns.18 
Further, the technology exists today that would allow a data broker 
to use already legally-collected information pertaining to a given 
individual to make highly accurate deductions and predictions 
about that individual. Consider also the steadily increasing utility 
and ubiquity of informal discovery and online research in 
litigation—including the employment of data brokers by 
attorneys.19  
The practical applications and advantages of having access to 
such information on one’s adversaries for parties engaged in 
litigation, or potential litigation, are readily apparent, both in terms 
of leading to discoverable evidence to be used at trial as well as in 
discovering inadmissible information that is nevertheless 
advantageous to creative litigants engaged in contentious civil or 
criminal litigation. For instance, imagine the value to a corporate 
defendant engaged in settlement negotiations with an injured 
plaintiff-employee to know that that injured worker is facing 
severe financial constraints. Consider the degree to which that 
same defendant’s negotiating position would be strengthened if it 
possessed information that the same plaintiff had a child at home 
with an expensive-to-treat chronic illness—how much more 
financially desperate and, thus, eager to settle, would such a 
plaintiff be? Consider further how advantageous it would be for a 
family law attorney to be able to employ data experts to determine 
the likelihood of a party’s infidelity or the likelihood of a spouse’s 
continued substance abuse in child custody proceedings. How 
might such information inform settlement negotiations, 
investigatory tactics, or trial strategy? 
                                                
17 See, e.g., CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 156 (“[F]irms of all stripes 
amass mountains of personal information concerning all aspects of our lives, 
share it with others without our knowledge, and use it in ways we could hardly 
imagine.”). 
18  See infra Part III.D (discussing the shortcomings of anonymization 
strategies). 
19 See, e.g., infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (discussing attorneys’ 
use of data brokers). 
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The field of predictive analytics,20 described below, is becoming 
more sophisticated, and is capable of making increasingly accurate 
deductions from the personal data already available to data 
brokers. Data brokers already create profiles and dossiers of 
individuals for sale.21 The primary constraints on the industry are 
self-regulatory in nature, enforced only by the public’s capacity for 
outrage at private sector data collection and privacy intrusions.22 
Had legal practitioners been able to foresee twenty years ago the 
impact that public online postings and social media would have on 
future litigation, attorneys may have prevented their clients from 
voluntarily distributing highly personal, potentially damaging 
information out into the world. Since personal information, once 
gleaned—from browsing habits, online purchases, customer 
loyalty and reward cards, the use of the various devices that 
comprise the Internet of things, online surveys, GPS tracking 
                                                
20 See infra Part III.A (describing the field of predictive analytics). 
21 See infra notes 107–10 and accompanying text (describing “people search” 
and related products). 
22 See PEW RES. CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN 
THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 3 (Nov. 12, 2014), available at http://www. 
pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf (noting 
that, even though a majority of Americans would like to see the government do 
more to regulate private sector data collection, fifty-five percent of respondents 
“‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the statement: ‘I am willing to share some 
information about myself with companies in order to use online services for 
free.’”); see also infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text; 60 Minutes: Data 
Brokers (CBS television broadcast Aug. 24, 2014); Shannon Pettypiece & Jordan 
Roberston, Did You Know You Know Had Diabetes? It’s All Over the Internet, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-
09-11/how-big-data-peers-inside-your-medicine-chest. But see PEW RES. CTR., 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 
28 (Nov. 12, 2014), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_ 
PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf (“[P]ublic concern over the amount of 
personal information businesses are collecting has been growing.”). See 
generally infra Part II.C. Given current research and trends, it would not be 
unreasonable for one to conclude that, although public concern over private 
sector data collection may be growing as Americans become more educated on 
the subject, few will demand comprehensive change simply due to the 
convenience offered by free online services. See infra note 270 and 
accompanying text (discussing “privacy fatigue”).  
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information reported by mobile devices, and on and on—is often 
never truly deleted, this Article attempts to make the case that a 
new ethical obligation is emerging which makes it incumbent upon 
attorneys to advise their clients of what is necessary to prevent 
their personal data from leaking out into the digital world today, so 
that it might not be used against them tomorrow.  
Part II describes some of the more common private sector data 
collection practices. Part III introduces big data and predictive 
analytics, and attempts to demonstrate how conclusions can be 
drawn from vast amounts of seemingly innocuous data. Part IV 
describes the current legal climate in which the industry operates. 
Part V comments on the impact these developments are having on 
the attorney’s duty of competence. Part VI then sets forth some of 
the more basic suggested techniques of stopping or, at least, 
slowing and diluting the flow of one’s personal data out into the 
digital realm. 
II.  THE HARVEST—HOW INFORMATION IS COLLECTED, 
AGGREGATED, AND PROCESSED 
“Our digital reach will soon approach nearly every Internet user 
in the U.S.”23 
Begin with this basic premise: deductions can be made from 
information. The more information one has, the more one can 
deduce. Additionally, when one has historical data for comparison, 
one can more accurately make predictions. The following section 
discusses some of the more common ways that private companies 
                                                
23 Judith Aquino, Acxiom Prepares New ‘Audience Operating System’ Amid 
Wobbly Earnings, AD EXCHANGER (Aug. 1, 2013 2:48 PM), http://www. 
adexchanger.com/analytics/acxiom-prepares-new-audience-operating-system-amid-
wobbly-earnings/ (quoting Scott Howe, CEO of Acxiom); see also Richard 
Behar, Never Heard of Acxiom? Chances Are It’s Heard of You, FORTUNE (Feb. 
23, 2004), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/ 
02/23/362182/index.htm; ACXIOM CORP., ANNUAL REPORT (2013), available at 
d3u9yejw7h244g.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/2013-Annual-Report.pdf 
(“[O]ur capabilities include . . . multi-sourced insight into approximately 700 
million consumers worldwide [with] [o]ver 3,000 propensities for nearly every 
U.S. consumer.”).  
538 N.C. J.L. & TECH.  [VOL. 16: 527 
  
are amassing information about virtually every person on earth—
one click, purchase, or digital transaction at a time—in order to 
make those deductions and sell the results. 
A. Tracking Methodology  
The diversity of methods by which information is collected in 
today’s increasingly digitized environment is difficult to overstate. 
Take Internet browsing: the typical person’s daily Internet activity 
is collected, traced, logged, and analyzed by a dizzying number of 
entities in a variety of ways. The data-collecting entities 
themselves are often divided into two groups: so-called “first 
parties”—social media, news websites, online retailers, and other 
consumer websites—who collect information directly from users, 
often unbeknownst to the users themselves, and “third parties”—
those to whom information is either passed by first parties or who 
conduct their own monitoring and tracking of one’s browsing 
habits surreptitiously.24   
Every individual computer, smartphone, and tablet currently 
connected to the Internet has a unique Internet Protocol (“IP”) 
address, like a digital fingerprint.25 While websites need a user’s IP 
                                                
24 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 41; see also Daniel J. 
Solove, Privacy & Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1411 (2001) (“Currently, there are two basic 
ways personal information is collected in cyberspace: (1) by directly collecting 
information from users (registration and transactional data); and (2) by 
surreptitiously tracking the way people navigate through the Internet 
(clickstream data).”); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, et al., Symposium: Privacy 
and Accountability in the 21st Century: Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You 
Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 276 (2012). 
25 See Anne Klinefelter, When to Research is to Reveal: The Growing Threat 
to Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 6 (2011); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: 
Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1814, 1837 (2011) (describing the IP address as “a unique identifier that 
is assigned to every computer connected to the internet”); see also Joshua J. 
McIntyre, Symposium: Trial 2010: A Look Inside Our Nation’s Courtrooms: 
Twentieth Annual DePaul Law Review Symposium: Comment: Balancing 
Expectations of Online Privacy: Why Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses Should 
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address to deliver content, some websites also use these unique 
addresses to track Internet users for purposes such as billing, 
customer service, tracking user preferences, and targeted 
marketing, among others.26 It is also standard practice for websites 
to collect the web address or universal resource locator (“URL”) of 
the page that linked to them (i.e. the referring URL) which itself 
can reveal the user’s immediately prior-used search terms and 
websites visited, while also collecting the date and time that 
someone from a particular IP address visited their website.27   
While IP addresses, being generally fixed, are typically 
associated with either a unique home or office Internet connection, 
and thus easily associated with a specific individual through their 
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), they can also easily become 
associated with a specific individual through a rather simple 
analysis of a user’s web traffic.28 First-party websites also acquire 
personal information whenever a user willingly volunteers it, for 
instance, by opening an account and giving a full name, home 
address, email address, or taking an online quiz entitled “Are You 
Good in Bed?”.29 A recent article in the Washington Post reported 
that the analytics code used by BuzzFeed, a self-described “social 
                                                                                                         
Be Protected as Personally Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 
895–96 (2011).  
26 Klinefelter, supra note 25, at 6; see also Eloise Gratton, If Personal 
Information Is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, then Risk of Harm is the Key: A Proposed 
Method for Determining What Counts as Personal Information, 24 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 105, 122 (2014) (citing Lisa J. Sotto & Melinda L. McLellan, 
Online Behavioral Advertising: A User’s Guide, IP LITIG., Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 
1–2) (“[B]ehavioral advertising may often involve the collection of IP addresses 
and the processing of unique identifiers (through the use of cookies).”). 
27 Klinefelter, supra note 25, at 8. 
28 See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 25, at 1837–40 (discussing various 
techniques that enable the linking of IP addresses to specific individuals and 
providing several examples). See, e.g., infra notes 170–77. See also Elbert Lin, 
Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1085, 1104 n.101 (2002) (discussing static versus dynamic IP addresses). 
29 See Steven C. Bennett, Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising, 44 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 899, 901 (2011); Alyssa Bailey, Quiz: Are You Good in 
Bed?, COSMOPOLITAN (July 2, 2014), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/ 
a26964/cosmo-quiz-are-you-good-in-bed/. 
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news and entertainment company[,]” indicated that “the site has 
tools in place to build individualized data profiles based on users’ 
quiz responses—which sometimes include deeply personal 
information, like whether you[ have] had an eating disorder or 
taken meds for a mental illness.”30   
Independent of IP address tracking, one of the most common 
ways that both first- and, particularly, third-party tracking occurs is 
with “cookies.” 31  Cookies are small bits of text that are 
downloaded automatically from websites by a user’s browser as 
one navigates the Internet.32 They essentially identify the computer 
on which they are stored, carrying information about what a user 
does online back to the website that attached the cookie to the 
user’s computer in the first place.33 Websites use cookies for a 
variety of purposes, such as remembering a user’s preferences on 
that site or understanding how users are actually using a site in 
order to improve site performance and security.34 Cookies also 
track browsing activity and collect information for advertisers and 
data brokers. 35  Further, while cookies do not always contain 
                                                
30 BUZZFEED, About, http://www.buzzfeed.com/about (last visited Dec. 28, 
2014); Caitlin Dewey, The Scary, Eye-Opening Truth of Internet Tracking – on 
Buzzfeed Quizzes, and Everywhere Else, WASH. POST (Jun. 26, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/06/26/the-scary-eye-
opening-truth-of-internet-tracking-on-buzzfeed-quizzes-and-everywhere-else/. 
31 See Joanna Geary, Tracking the Trackers: What Are Cookies? An Introduction 
to Web Tracking, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2012, 12:08 PM), http://www. 
theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/23/cookies-and-web-tracking-intro. Jay P. 
Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud Computing: 
Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 341, 437 (2013) (describing cookies). 
32 See Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 437 (describing the distinction between 
text cookies and flash cookies). 
33 Geary, supra note 31; Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 437. 
34 Geary, supra note 31; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral 
Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 276 
(2012) (defining cookies as “small text files that typically contain a string of 
numbers that can be used to identify a computer”). 
35 See Adam Tanner, The Web Cookie Is Dying. Here’s the Creepier Technology 
That Comes Next, FORBES (June 17, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/adamtanner/2013/06/17/the-web-cookie-is-dying-heres-the-creepier-technology- 
that-comes-next/; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at v (“Data brokers rely 
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personally identifiable information, some companies specifically 
provide the service of linking cookies to users’ personal 
information.36 
Many websites, however, are now employing alternatives to 
cookies in order to track online behavior. This course change is in 
part a response to the so-called “Do Not Track” (“DNT”) 
initiative.37 In the Internet community’s attempt at a Do Not Call 
list,38 the DNT concept was originally envisioned as a simple way 
for consumers to control and limit the extent to which their online 
activity is tracked.39 DNT features are often available as a setting 
on an individual’s web browser that tells the browser to 
communicate to websites that the user wishes not to have his or her 
online activity tracked.40 Some browsers provide a similar feature 
                                                                                                         
on websites with registration features and cookies to find consumers online and 
target Internet advertisements to them based on their offline activities.”). 
36 Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 437 (citing Daniel J. Solove, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 24–25 (2006)) 
(“[A] company called DoubleClick provides a service to websites, connecting 
cookies to personal information to enable more targeted advertising.”); see also 
Dillon Reisman et al., Cookies That Give You Away: Evaluating the 
Surveillance Implications of Web Tracking 1–2 (Working Draft, Apr. 2, 2014), 
available at http://randomwalker.info/publications/cookie-surveillance.pdf 
(describing technical methods for identifying individuals through cookie 
tracking even in the absence of knowing a target’s IP address); see also Adi 
Kamdar et al., NSA Turns Cookies (And More) Into Surveillance Beacons, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/nsa-
turns-cookies-and-more-surveillance-beacons (describing the use of PREF 
cookies to uniquely identify individuals). 
37 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 42–43. 
38 Zach Miners, How Bickering and Greed Neutered the “Do Not Track” 
Privacy Initiative, PC WORLD (May 22, 2014, 6:22 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/ 
article/2158220/do-not-track-oh-what-the-heck-go-ahead.html. 
39 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4 at 42–43. FEDERAL TRADE 
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS at vi–vii (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-
trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting- 
consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 FTC Report]. 
40 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 42–43; see also Do Not 
Track Test Page, MICROSOFT, ie.microsoft.com/TEStdrive/Browser/DoNotTrack/ 
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by offering privacy settings that allow the wholesale blocking of 
third-party cookies.41 However, currently, many sites do not honor 
DNT requests. Even sites that do respond to DNT requests often 
interpret such requests in different ways due to a lack of consensus 
among Internet companies and service providers. Other sites 
simply show unwillingness on their part to acquiesce to the intent 
of DNT.42 As a result, while utilizing a DNT feature on one’s 
browser will indeed send a signal to a host website that the user 
wishes not to be tracked, that request will likely be ignored.43 In 
what is generally a “self-regulating” industry, this phenomenon is 
not encouraging.44 
This has given rise to so-called “web beacons,” also known as 
“pixel” tracking.45 These small bits of code embedded into a web 
page that are invisible to the user and track that user’s activity 
wherever they go online, sending signals regarding his or her 
activity back to the beacons’ hosts.46 This is particularly relevant in 
                                                                                                         
Default.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (“This page detects whether or not 
your browser has a Do Not Track preference set.”). 
41 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 42–43. 
42 See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Yahoo Won’t Honor ‘Do Not Track’ Requests from 
Users, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014, 8:22 PM), blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/02/ 
yahoo-wont-honor-do-not-track-requests-from-users. 
43 Miners, supra note 38; see also Dwoskin, supra note 42; Fred B. Campbell, 
Jr., The Slow Death of “Do Not Track,” N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 26, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/the-slow-death-of-do-not-track.html?_r=0. 
44 See infra notes 268–69 and accompanying text.   
45 Geary, supra note 31; Violet Blue, Facebook Turns User Tracking “Bug” 
Into Data Mining “Feature” for Advertisers, ZD NET (June 17, 2014, 12:01 
PM), http://www.zdnet.com/facebook-turns-user-tracking-bug-into-data-mining-
feature-for-advertisers-7000030603/; see also Matthew Sundquist, Online Privacy 
Protection: Protecting Privacy, the Social Contract, and the Rule of Law in the 
Virtual World, 25 REGENT U.L. REV. 153, 161–62 (2013) (“Lotame Solutions 
uses web beacons that record what a person types on a website in order to create 
a user profile, while Apple, Verizon, Target, and others compile information 
from customers’ interactions with their products.”). 
46 Geary, supra note 31; Blue, supra note 45; see also Pixel Tracking in 
Third-Party and Custom Creatives, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/ 
dfp_premium/answer/1347585?hl=en (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (“A tracking 
pixel is simply code inserted into a custom or third-party creative that makes a 
server call and returns a transparent 1x1 image (normally a GIF file).”); see also 
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light of the changes to Facebook’s privacy policy that took place in 
the summer of 2014. The new policy stated that Facebook would 
begin collecting information about users from sites they visit, apps 
they use, and their browsing histories, even when a user is not 
logged into Facebook.47 The Facebook blog stated that, “[i]n short, 
your browsing habits on any site or mobile app with a Facebook 
like button (who doesn’t have that nowadays) can also be viewed 
by Facebook and thus used for advertising data.”48 
A relatively new technology known as “canvas fingerprinting” 
is also growing in popularity as the tracking method du jour.49 
                                                                                                         
Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network Theory 
Approach to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 493, 
496 n.17 (2004) (“A web bug, also known as a ‘pixel tag.’ ‘web beacon,’ or 
‘clear GIF,’ is a lx1 pixel image embedded in html code. If a web bug is present, 
instead of simply fetching an image, a server invokes a CGI program that logs 
information about the user's actions.”). 
47 See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, Facebook Ad Targeting Will Use Even More 
of Your Data, NPR (June 12, 2014. 1:14 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
alltechconsidered/2014/06/12/321325434/facebook-ad-targeting-will-use-even-
more-of-your-data. See also Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www. 
facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Dec. 13, 2014) (discussing 
“other information we receive about you”). It should be noted that the Facebook 
privacy terms have since been further amended; however, as one technology 
writer reported, quoting the Washington Post’s Switch blog, “Facebook rewrites 
its privacy policy so that humans can understand it,” and also quoting Fortune’s 
Tech blog as stating, “Facebook’s privacy policy is clearer, but no less 
complicated.” Jennifer Abel, Facebook Rewrites and Sort-of Updates Its Privacy 
Policies, Again, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www. 
consumeraffairs.com/news/ 
facebook-rewrites-and-sort-of-updates-its-privacy-policies-again-112414.html. 
48 Shruti Dhapola, How Facebook’s New “Ad Preference” Policy is Threatening 
Your Privacy, TECH2 (June 18, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://tech.firstpost.com/news-
analysis/how-facebooks-new-ad-preference-policy-is-threatening-your-privacy-
226028.html (quoting Facebook’s blog). 
49 See Sneaky New Tactics May Be Tracking You Online, CBS NEWS (July 24, 
2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sneaky-new-tactics-may-be-
tracking-you-online; see also Gunes Acar et al., The Web Never Forgets: Persistent 
Tracking Mechanisms in the Wild (Aug. 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/persistent/the_web_never_ 
forgets.pdf; Olga Kharif, The Cookies You Can’t Crumble, BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 
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Whereas traditional tracking methods involve the transfer of small 
segments of code or files, such as cookies, thus enabling them to 
be more easily identified by the user, canvas fingerprinting is 
virtually undetectable to the average Internet user.50 This method is 
predicated on the idea that no two computer systems are exactly 
alike due to the extremely high number of possible combinations 
of a multitude of variables from one device to another—in terms of 
various operating systems, versions of those systems, browsers, 
graphics settings, font settings, and the like—à la “fingerprinting.”51 
Utilizing this phenomenon, websites send a request to a user’s 
browser to draw a small text image, to which the browser 
complies. Due to the differences in settings from one user’s 
computer to another, this creates an identifiable “fingerprint,” in 
that each computer and browser displays the text in a singular and 
uniquely identifiable manner.52 Thus, when different websites use 
the same tracking methodology, they can track a single user from 
one site to another, generally unhindered by his or her use of anti-
tracking tools or browser privacy settings.53   
The use of these and similar technologies are commonly 
employed to monitor the ongoing web activity of virtually all 
Internet users on the planet. A 2010 Wall Street Journal 
investigation found that the “nation’s 50 top websites on average 
installed 64 pieces of tracking technology onto the computers of 
                                                                                                         
21, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-08-21/facebook-google-
go-beyond-cookies-to-reap-data-for-advertisers (discussing canvas fingerprinting). 
50 See Joseph Steinberg, You Are Being Tracked Online By a Sneaky New 
Technology—Here’s What You Need to Know, FORBES (July 23, 2014, 8:30 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2014/07/23/you-are-being-
tracked-online-by-a-sneaky-new-technology-heres-what-you-need-to-know/. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id.; see also Chris Smith, The Creepiest Internet Tracking Tool Yet Is 
“Virtually Impossible” to Block, BGR (July 22, 2014, 1:00 PM), bgr.com/2014/ 
07/22/canvas-fingerprinting-internet-tracking-tool/. But see Jeremy Kirk, ‘Canvas 
Fingerprinting’ Online Tracking Is Sneaky but Easy to Halt, PC WORLD (July 
25, 2014, 6:31 AM), www.pcworld.com/article/2458280/canvas-fingerprinting-
tracking-is-sneaky-but-easy-to-halt.html. 
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visitors, usually with no warning.”54 Privacy issues quickly emerge 
when third parties routinely track user activity en masse across 
multiple websites, allowing trackers to “infer users’ interests, 
perhaps sensitive ones, such as medical conditions, political 
opinions, or even sexual fetishes.”55 Furthermore, promising efforts 
are now underway to link consumers’ mobile devices to their home 
computers—a difficulty that has stymied advertisers and data 
brokers for some time—providing yet another source of personal 
data to private sector trackers.56 
                                                
54 See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 34, at 275 (quoting Julia Angwin, The 
Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404). 
55 Hoofnagle et al., supra note 34, at 276; see also WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 45 (“[Such precise profiling] represents a powerful 
capacity on the part of the private sector to collect information and use that 
information to algorithmically profile an individual . . . . This application of big 
data technology, if used improperly, irresponsibly, or nefariously, could have 
significant ramifications for targeted individuals.”). 
56 See, e.g., DRAWBRIDGE, http://www.drawbrid.ge/technology (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2014) (describing Drawbridge’s cross-linking of mobile devices to 
computers); see also SILVERPUSH, http://www.silvrpush.com/ (last visited Aug. 
21, 2014); Anthony Ha, SilverPush Says Its Using “Audio Beacons” for an 
Unusual Approach to Cross-Device Ad Targeting, TECHCRUNCH (July 24, 
2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/24/silverpush-audio-beacons/ (describing 
“audio beacons”). Basically, the company says it uses “ultrasonic inaudible 
sounds.” If you are browsing the web and encounter a SilverPush advertiser, 
then at the same time that they are dropping a cookie on your computer, they 
also play one of those sounds. You will not be able to hear it, but if you have 
installed any app that uses the SilverPush software development kit, it will 
actually be listening for that sound in the background, and when it detects an 
“audio beacon,” it is able to identify that your desktop/laptop computer and your 
phone/tablet belong to the same person. Id.; see also Kurt Wagner, Twitter to 
Start Tracking Which Apps Its Users Have Downloaded, RE/CODE (Nov. 26, 
2014, 9:45 AM), http://recode.net/2014/11/26/twitters-now-collecting-data-on-
which-apps-you-download/ (describing how both Apple’s iOS and Google’s 
Android already allow third parties to “ping a user’s device at any time and 
recall a list of apps that are currently running on their smartphone”); Robert 
McMillan, Verizon & AT&T Are the Only Wireless Carriers Using ‘Perma-
Cookies’, WIRED (Nov. 7, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/ 
permacookie-free/ (describing Verizon’s use of “perma-cookies”—small strings 
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To illustrate the practice of online tracking, several companies 
now offer products that allow Internet users to visualize online 
tracking as it occurs. For instance, in late 2013, Mozilla released an 
add-on57 called “Lightbeam” that was designed to demonstrate the 
tracking phenomenon to a mainstream audience. 58  Funded by 
grants from the Ford Foundation and the Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research Council, with assistance from students at the 
Emily Carr University of Art and Design, the Lightbeam add-on 
allows Firefox users to view a graphical representation of the 
tracking of their Internet browsing in real time. The tool represents 
the first-party sites that the user actually visits as circles and the 
third-party sites that monitor a user’s activities as triangular icons 
that revolve around their first party site counterpart.59 This allows 
users to watch as, on average, approximately ten to thirty third 
parties monitor their activities on the vast majority of first-party 
sites.60   
The Internet of things has further enhanced private companies’ 
ability to track consumers’ activities, and, thus, increased the 
private sector’s capacity to gather detailed and personal 
information on users. “Internet of things” is: 
                                                                                                         
of data that come preinstalled on phones and are slipped into all users’ web 
traffic for identification purposes). 
57 See Add-on, TECHTERMS, http://www.techterms.com/definition/addon (last 
visited Jul. 25, 2014) (defining “add-on” as “a software extension that adds extra 
features to a program. It may extend certain functions within the program, add 
new items to the program’s interface, or give the program additional 
capabilities.”). 
58  See Olivia Solon, Mozilla Releases Add-on that Reveals Online Data 
Tracking, WIRED (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-
10/24/lightbeam; see also Samuel Gibbs, Mozilla’s Lightbeam Firefox Tool 
Shows Who’s Tracking Your Online Movements, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/28/mozilla-lightbeam-
tracking-privacy-cookies. 
59 See Add-ons for Firefox, MOZILLA, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/ 
addon/lightbeam/ (last visited July 10, 2014). 
60 These figures were generated from firsthand use of the Lightbeam add-on. 
Notably, the Lightbeam privacy policy states “[b]y default, data collected by 
Lightbeam remains in your browser and is not sent to us.” Add-ons for Firefox, 
supra note 59. 
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[A] term used to describe the ability of devices to communicate with 
each other using embedded sensors that are linked through wired and 
wireless networks. These devices could include your thermostat, your 
car, or a pill you swallow so the doctor can monitor the health of your 
digestive tract. These connected devices use the Internet to transmit, 
compile, and analyze data.61 
As GPS chips ping our mobile devices and offer us alternative 
routes home to avoid traffic jams, and as we adjust our 
thermostats, home security cameras, and other household devices 
remotely, those devices produce data that is collected and available 
for analysis, creating a massive new set of tools for data 
production. 62  For instance, Nest, a recent $3.2 billion Google 
acquisition, is a company that creates systems that allow users to 
remotely control their thermostats.63 While one’s thermostat usage 
may not appear particularly compromising on its own, it does 
reveal highly particularized information about one’s living 
patterns—when one rises in the morning, goes to work, comes 
home in the evening, and goes to bed—which, when combined 
                                                
61 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see also Rolfe 
Winkler & Alistair Barr, Nest to Share User Information with Google for the 
First Time, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2014, 12:16 AM), blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/ 
06/24/nest-to-share-user-information-with-google-for-first-time/. 
62 See Chowdry, supra note 6; see also Bill Wasik, In the Programmable 
World, All Our Objects Will Act as One, WIRED (May 14, 2013, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-of-things-2/ (“A decade after Wi-Fi put 
all our computers on a wireless network—and half a decade after the 
smartphone revolution put a series of pocket-size devices on that network—we 
are seeing the dawn of an era when the most mundane items in our lives can talk 
wirelessly among themselves, performing tasks on command, giving us data 
we’ve never had before.”); Howard Baldwin, A Match Made Somewhere: Big 
Data and the Internet of Things, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2014, 11:06 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/howardbaldwin/2014/11/24/a-match-made-somewhere-
big-data-and-the-internet-of-things/ (“[O]nce the Internet of Things gets rolling, 
stand back. We’re going to have data spewing at us from all directions—from 
appliances, from machinery, from train tracks, from shipping containers, from 
power stations.”). 
63 Kashmir Hill, Nest Hackers Will Offer Tool to Keep the Google-Owned 
Company from Getting Users’ Data, FORBES (July 16, 2014, 9:25 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/16/nest-hack-privacy-tool/. Press 
Release, Google, Google to Acquire Nest (Jan. 13, 2014), available at 
https://investor.google.com/releases/2014/0113.html. 
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with additional data, helps to fill out the picture of an individual.64 
Google Glass—a wearable technology with Internet connectivity 
and video and picture-taking capability—is another example.65 
Before Google recently discontinued the Google Glass Explorer 
program,66 Google Glass was combined with facial recognition 
programs and apps such as NameTag.67 NameTag allows strangers 
to immediately access a person’s name, photos, and dating website 
profiles simply by looking at them.68 These capabilities of Google 
Glass in conjunction with several other data-producing and 
privacy-reducing features have led to some degree of public 
backlash, as evidenced by the rise of the term “glasshole” in the 
social vernacular, if nothing else.69 Furthermore, the development 
                                                
64 As an additional, noteworthy security risk, researchers at the University of 
Central Florida recently discovered that it was possible to take control of Nest 
and secretly siphon off data from the Nest system. Hill, supra note 63; see also 
David Perera, Smart Grid Powers Up Privacy Worries, POLITICO (Jan. 1, 2015, 
9:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/energy-electricity-data-use-
113901.html. 
65 See, e.g., Hayley Tsukayama, Everything You Need to Know About Google 
Glass, WASH. POST (Feb, 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/02/27/everything-you-need-to-know-about-google-glass/. 
66 See, e.g., Jennifer Booton, Why Google Glass Wasn’t a Failure, MARKETWATCH 
(Jan. 30, 2015, 9:14 AM) http://www.marketwatch.com/ story/no-google-glass-
wasnt-a-failure-2015-01-29. 
67 See generally NAMETAG, http://www.nametag.ws (last visited Jan. 31, 2015). 
68 See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Google Glass Facial Recognition App Draws Senator 
Franken’s Ire, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2015, 5:23 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kashmirhill/2014/02/05/google-glass-facial-recognition-app-draws-senator-frankens-
ire/. 
69 Id.; Jat Singh & Julia Powles, The Internet of Things – The Next Big 
Challenge to Our Privacy, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2014, 3:52 PM), http://www. 
theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/28/internet-of-things-privacy; see also STOP 
THE CYBORGS, http://ww.stopthecyborgs.org (last visited Aug. 21, 2014); 
MICHAEL JUNGLING & PATRICK A. WOOD, MORGAN STANLEY RES., MEDICAL 
DEVICES AND SERVICES (2014), available at http://www.sensium-healthcare.com/ 
sites/default/files/Pages%20from%20morgan_stanley_iot_april_2014.pdf (discussing 
Sensium’s new wearable healthcare patch, data collection, and anonymization); 
Rachel Metz, Google Glass is Dead; Long Live Smart Glasses, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/532691/google- 
glass-is-dead-long-live-smart-glasses/ (describing the failures of the Glass 
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of ubiquitous technologies and systems capable of tracking 
individuals in real time through their cell phones and wearable 
devices as a means of maximizing potential advertising efficacy 
has already begun.70 
The Internet of Things market is growing rapidly. A recent 
study by the International Data Corporation estimates that the 
Internet of Things market worldwide will be worth approximately 
$7.1 trillion by 2020.71 Some estimates put the global number of 
devices connected to the Internet around 6 billion; others estimate 
that it will reach around 200 billion by 2020. 72  Economic 
incentives entice increasing numbers of consumers to use devices 
such as Progressive Insurance’s “Snapshot” program, which offers 
automobile insurance rate reductions in exchange for the 
installation of a vehicular tracking device that monitors driving 
speed, time, and habits. As a result, some have argued that this 
“unraveling of privacy” is creating unprecedented challenges to 
existing privacy law, which was established primarily with an eye 
                                                                                                         
marketing strategy, but concluding that the ubiquity of similar wearables is 
inevitable). 
70 See Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention Shoppers: Store Is 
Tracking Your Cell, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
07/15/business/attention-shopper-stores-are-tracking-your-cell.html?pagewanted=all; 
Keith Wagstaff, New York City Nixes Advertising ‘Beacons’ in Telephone 
Booths, NBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014, 4:27 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/ 
security/new-york-city-nixes-advertising-beacons-telephone-booths-n219281. 
71 See Press Release, Int’l Data Corp., The Internet of Things Moves Beyond the 
Buzz: Worldwide Market Forecast to Exceed $7 Trillion by 2020, IDC Says (June 3, 
2014), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140603005446/en/ 
Internet-Moves-Buzz-Worldwide-Market-Forecast-Exceed#.VN9qEPnF91Z; 
Chowdry, supra note 6. But see Marco della Cava, Privacy Integral to Future of the 
Internet of Things, USA TODAY (July 11, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/tech/2014/07/10/internet-of-things-privacy-summit/12496613/ (stating that the 
2020 market will be worth approximately $15 billion). 
72 Stefan Ferber, How the Internet of Things Changes Everything, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (May 7, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/05/how-the-internet-of-things-cha/; 
Mark Van Rijmenam, How the Internet of Things Will Make a Smart World—
Infographic, DATAFLOQ, https://datafloq.com/read/internet-of-things-will-make-
our-world-smart-infographic/302 (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
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toward preventing uninvited intrusions as opposed to willful 
surveillance as part of an economic transaction.73 
Consumers should also not be surprised that the apps they 
routinely download to smartphones and tablets often collect huge 
swaths of information about them.74 The permissions to which 
consumers must agree as a prerequisite for the download or usage 
of an app often function as a consumer’s consent to have their data 
tracked and recorded. The Pew Research Group has identified an 
ever-growing list of over 126 different permissions that apps 
typically ask for, including a user’s location, browser history and 
bookmarks, calendar events, contact data, cell phone bills, email 
accounts, mapping applications, and hardware permissions that 
allow an app to access or use, for instance, a device’s camera or 
                                                
73 See Neil M. Richards, Symposium: Privacy and Technology: The Dangers 
of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1940 (2013) (describing this 
phenomenon as to the Progressive “MyRate” program); see also Snapshot 
Privacy Statement, PROGRESSIVE.COM, http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot-
privacy-statement/ (last updated Mar. 11, 2014). 
74 See, e.g., Kenneth Olmstead, Mobile Apps Collect Information About Users, 
With Wide Range of Permissions, PEW RESEARCH (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www. 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/29/mobile-apps-collect-information-about-
users-with-wide-range-of-permissions/; see also Chloe Albanesius, Android 
Flashlight App Shared User Data Without Permission, PC MAG. (Dec. 5, 2013, 
2:50 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2427999,00.asp (describing 
the Android Flashlight App’s practice of collecting user data and distributing 
users’ personal information to third parties without users’ consent, and the 
settlement with the Federal Trade Commission that followed); Julia Angwin & 
Jeff Larson, FAQ About NSA’s Interest in Angry Birds and Other ‘Leaky Apps,’ 
PRO PUBLICA (Jan. 28, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/faq-
about-nsas-interest-in-angry-birds-and-other-leaky-apps (describing American and 
British intelligence agencies’ widespread practice of targeting and hacking app 
developers because of their veritable treasure troves of personal data on 
individuals); What They Know – Mobile, WALL ST. J., http://blogs.wsj.com/wtk-
mobile/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (part of an ongoing investigative series into 
data privacy in which the Wall Street Journal analyzes the data collected by over 
100 iPhone and Android apps, and describes what each app stated to users as to 
the information being gathered). 
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microphone surreptitiously.75 Additional personal information is 
voluntarily surrendered in the form of “loyalty programs” and 
“customer rewards cards,” which companies use to track and 
analyze user purchases and habits.76 There are already documented 
instances of healthcare systems culling information gleaned from 
these rewards programs and using it to proactively predict the 
impact of certain buying patterns on an individual’s health.77 
In the interest of fairness, and despite the unsettling overtones 
of such constant monitoring, there are undoubtedly aspects of this 
data collection that are not without their upside. After all, online 
advertising and marketing practices are fueled by big data 
analytics, and these industries effectively subsidize a tremendous 
amount of activity online. 78  However, while many consumers 
appear to be content with this “value for value” exchange, in which 
                                                
75 Olmstead, supra note 74; see also Chris Smith, Facebook’s Android App 
Wants to Do Strange Things to Your Phone, BGR (Mar. 6, 2014, 2:21 PM), 
http://bgr.com/2014/03/06/facebook-android-app-permissions/. 
76  See, e.g., Tom Groenfeldt, Sears Competes on Big Data and Loyalty 
Programs, FORBES (May 2, 2012, 10:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
tomgroenfeldt/2012/05/02/sears-competes-on-big-data-and-loyalty-programs/; see 
also Rajkumar Venkatesan, Big Data Is an Opportunity to Win More Customers, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
capitalbusiness/big-data-is-an-opportunity-to-win-more-customers/2014/08/15/ 
15a31396-2254-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story.html; Tom Brewster, Facebook, 
Google, and Personal Data: What’s Your Worth?, BBC (May 12, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140509-how-much-is-your-facebook-worth; 
Ben Kepes, Is This the Final Straw? Uber’s Android Application—“Literally 
Malware,” FORBES (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
benkepes/2014/11/26/is-this-the-final-straw-ubers-android-application-literally-
malware/. 
77 See Shannon Pettypiece & Jordan Robertson, Hospitals Are Mining Patients’ 
Credit Card Data to Predict Who Will Get Sick, BUS. WK. (July 3, 2014), http://www. 
businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-03/hospitals-are-mining-patients-credit-card-
data-to-predict-who-will-get-sick; see also Kelly Dilworth, Health Care Companies 
Turn to Big Data, YAHOO FIN. (Aug. 14, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://finance. 
yahoo.com/news/health-care-companies-turn-big-120000707.html; Joseph Walker, 
Data Mining to Recruit Sick People, WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2013), http:// 
online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB100014240527023037221045792401405
54518458-lMyQjAxMTA0MDAwNjEwNDYyWj. 
78 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 50.  
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personal information is readily traded, there is merit in being 
cognizant of the fact that the Internet is not “free.” As one 
commentator recently put it, “[w]e have become the product.”79 
B. The Value of Data 
The reason for this seemingly endless collection of data is that 
this data is proving to be extraordinarily valuable to data brokers, 
advertisers, investigators, law enforcement agencies, and many 
others.80 In 2003, there were already more than one thousand 
companies conducting data-mining activities on American 
consumers.81 In 2012, data was a $300 billion per year industry 
employing more than three million people in the United States 
alone.82 Acxiom Corporation, for instance, sometimes described as 
“the biggest company you’ve never heard of,”83 has been said to 
have amassed the largest commercial database on consumers 
                                                
79 Claire Porter, Little Privacy in the Age of Big Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 
20, 2014, 12:19 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/20/little-
privacy-in-the-age-of-big-data; see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The 
Online Market’s Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 
96 (2013) (noting the failure of the data-for-services economy in part because 
customers rarely know the cost, thus preventing them from making educated 
purchase choices based on cost and desire as they would for any other product). 
80 See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 41 (“Users, 
more often than not, do not understand the degree to which they are a 
commodity in each level of this marketplace.”); see also CUKIER BIG DATA, 
supra note 4, at 98–122 (“The crux of data’s worth is its seemingly unlimited 
potential for reuse.”); see also Ashkan Soltani et al., NSA Uses Google Cookies 
to Pinpoint Targets for Hacking, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-
pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/ (describing how the NSA piggybacks into users’ 
systems using private sector cookies). 
81 Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy 
Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 63, 65 (2003) 
(citing Robert O’Harrow, Data Firms Getting Too Personal?, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 8, 1998, at A1). 
82 Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, 
CNN (Aug. 23, 2012, 8:52 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/ 
big-data-acxiom/ (citing information from the McKinsey Global Institute). 
83 Id. 
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currently in existence.84 In 2012, Acxiom executives boasted that 
their database contained information on more than a half billion 
consumers—including a majority of adults in the United States—
with approximately 1,500 individual data points per person. 85 
Intelius, Inc. provides its customers with background check and 
public record information from a database containing more than 
twenty billion records.86 PeekYou uses “patented technology that 
analyzes content from over sixty social media sites, news sources, 
homepages, and blog platforms to provide clients with detailed 
consumer profiles.”87 
In order to categorize consumers based on lifestyle, habits, and 
preferences, some data brokers have identified individuals that fit 
into certain discrete groups of their own creation, such as “Ethnic 
Second-City-Strugglers,” “Retiring on Empty: Singles,” “Tough 
Start: Young Single Parents,” “Credit Crunched: City Families,” 
and “Rural and Barely Making It.”88 Additional categories include 
“‘Rural Everlasting,’ which comprises single men and women over 
the age of 66 with ‘low educational attainment and low net 
worths,’” as well as “Expectant Parent,” “Diabetes Interest,” and 
“Cholesterol Focus.”89 
                                                
84 Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-
quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
85 Id. (“[Acxiom] peers deeper into American life than the F.B.I. or the I.R.S., or 
those prying digital eyes at Facebook and Google. If you are an American adult, 
the odds are that [Acxiom] knows things like your age, race, sex, weight, height, 
marital status, education level, politics, buying habits, household health worries, 
vacation dreams—and on and on.); see also Philip Bump, How Facebook Plans to 
Become One of the Most Powerful Tools in Politics, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/11/26/how-facebook-plans-
to-become-one-of-the-most-powerful-tools-in-politics/ (describing the partnership 
between Facebook and Acxiom in terms of amassing and analyzing individuals’ 
personal data for use in political campaigns). 
86 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; see generally How We Do It, INTELLIUS, 
http://corp.intelius.com (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
87 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; see also PEEKYOU, http://www.peekyou.com 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
88 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 44. 
89 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at v. 
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The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) recently 
reported on one data broker that maintains detailed profiles on 
specific consumers, cataloging ailments ranging from cancer and 
diabetes to clinical depression and prostate problems.90 A 2013 
Senate report “describes another data broker that keeps 75,000 data 
elements about consumers in its system, including the use of yeast 
infection products, laxatives, and OB/GYN services, among other 
health-related data.”91 All of this collection takes place outside of 
the regulatory scope of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), which governs patient privacy and 
confidentiality.92 Furthermore, the recent shift amongst hospitals to 
move to digital record keeping has likewise led to patient 
records—presumably stripped of identifying information93—being 
sold to third-party data-aggregation companies by the state 
agencies with which hospitals share those records.94 Similarly, in 
an effort apparently aimed at skirting certain provisions of the Fair 
                                                
90 Julie Brill, Commissioner, FTC, Address at the Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University: Big Data and Consumer 
Privacy: Identifying Challenges, Finding Solutions, at 4, Feb. 20, 2014 (citing 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON 
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP., U.S. SENATE, INFORMATION RESELLERS 
CONSUMER PRIVACY FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT CHANGES IN TECH. AND 
THE MARKETPLACE 53 (2013)), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_statements/202151/140220princetonbigdata_0.pdf 
91 Id. at 4 (citing STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP., 
113th CONG., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE 
AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES 12, 14 (2013) (citing 
documentary submission from Equifax and listing health care-related data 
elements that Equifax maintains)). 
92 Id. 
93 See infra Part III.D (discussing the failures of anonymization). 
94 See, e.g., Jordan Robertson, Your Medical Records Are for Sale, BUS. WK. 
(Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-08/your-medical-
records-are-for-sale; see also Jordan Robertson, States Hospital Data for Sale 
Puts Privacy in Jeopardy, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/states-hospital-data-for-sale-puts-privacy-in-
jeopardy.html; Thomas Claburn, FTC: Data Brokers Know You Better Than Your 
Mom Does, INFO. WK. (May, 28, 2014), https://www.informationweek.com/ 
mobile/mobile-business/ftc-data-brokers-know-you-better-than-mom-does/d/d-
id/1269227?piddl_msgid=219930#msg_219930. 
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Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), subprime mortgage and payday 
lenders are using consumer profiles to identify vulnerable new 
potential customers.95   
There are also a growing number of instances of companies 
using big data analytics to deploy differential pricing models 
designed to target specific consumers for higher prices based on 
their consumer profiles. 96  For instance, there are documented 
examples of consumers paying different prices based on their 
geographic location.97 An analysis of the online pricing practices of 
Staples, Inc., by the Wall Street Journal, for instance, ironically 
found that areas that had a higher average income tended to be able 
to purchase a given item from Staples at a lower price.98 In the 
same article, it was discovered that Office Depot “uses customers’ 
browsing history and geolocation to vary the offers and products it 
displays to a visitor to its [web]site.”99 Moreover, this type of 
behavior is far from unusual. Amazon, Capital One, Discover 
Financial Services, Orbitz, Lowe’s, and Rosetta Stone have all 
employed big data analytics to vary pricing based on a given 
consumer’s data profile. 100  Differential pricing has become of 
particular use to companies operating in industries in which prices 
vary substantially and often, such as in the hotel and airline 
                                                
95 Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising 
Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 857 
(2014); see also FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at i; John Lippert, Lender Charging 
390% Uses Data to Screen Out Deadbeats, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2014, 4:49 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-01/lender-charging-390-uses-data-to-
screen-out-deadbeats.html. 
96 See, e.g., Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices, Thanks to 
Big Data, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
adamtanner/2014/03/26/different-customers-different-prices-thanks-to-big-data/; 
see also Adam Ozimek, Will Big Data Bring More Price Discrimination?, 
FORBES (Sept. 1, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/ 
2013/09/01/will-big-data-bring-more-price-discrimination/. 
97 Jennifer Valentino-Devries et al., Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on 
Users’ Information, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
100 Id. 
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industries, as well as in industries in which costs and prices are 
somewhat shrouded, such as in the insurance industry. More and 
more, differential pricing is being routinely deployed against 
consumers in the American marketplace.101 
Given this framework, it is not surprising that some estimates 
put the value of a single individual’s data profile upwards of 
$5,000 per year. 102  It is perhaps for this reason that some 
pro-consumer initiatives have developed in an effort to reclaim 
one’s personal data. For instance, the Citizenme initiative seeks to 
shift Internet power and economics back in the direction of 
consumers by providing a long-term plan to facilitate the deliberate 
sale of consumers’ personal information directly to specific buyers, 
rather than having it clandestinely stripped by others.103 Essentially, 
Citizenme is an app to which a user would link his or her 
Facebook, Twitter, and other accounts.104 It then allows users to see 
what data is shared on those networks, highlights particularly 
alarming privacy policy provisions in red, and alerts users and 
permits them to vote for or against changes made to privacy 
policies and terms of service.105 Similarly, DataCoup empowers 
                                                
101 Tanner, supra note 96; see generally Walter Baker et al., Using Big Data 
to Make Better Pricing Decisions, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2014) http://www. 
mckinsey.com/insights/marketing_sales/using_big_data_to_make_better_pricing
_decisions (describing the process of using data to make more profitable pricing 
decisions). 
102 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 95, at 865–66 (citing Quentin Fottrell, Who 
Would Pay $5,000 to Use Google? (You), MARKET WATCH (Jan. 25, 2012, 
12:24 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/realtimeadvice/2012/01/25/who-would-
pay-5000-to-use-google-you/?mg=blogs-sm. 
103 See Klint Finley, The App That Lets You Spy on Yourself and Sell Your 
Own Data, WIRED (July 9, 2014, 1:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/ 
citizenme/. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.; see also Stilgherrian, Big Data Is Just a Big, Distracting Bubble, Soon 
to Burst, ZD NET (July 11, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/big-data-is-just-a-big-
distracting-bubble-soon-to-burst-7000031480 (describing the Respect Network, 
and the “Login with Respect” initiative); David Braue, Respect Network Marries 
Security, Trust in Portable Cloud Data Push, CSO (July 9, 2014, 9:05 PM), 
http://www.cso.com.au/article/549571/_respect_network_marries_security_trust_
portable_cloud_data_push/. 
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willing consumers to aggregate, package, and sell their own 
personal data, thus cutting out the data broker as an unnecessary 
intermediary.106 Whether users will ultimately be willing to sell 
their personal data to brokers and advertisers remains something of 
an open question. Regardless, brokers are already selling users’ 
information to each other. 
C. The Negotiation of Information 
As one company gleans information, it is sold to another. Of 
particular interest to attorneys is the trend represented by the 
emergence of so-called “people search” products offered by data 
brokers. 107  These products offer personal information about 
individuals and are unique in that they are marketed for use by 
individuals rather than businesses, advertisers, or corporations.108 
These products are already capable of providing huge amounts of 
information on a targeted individual, such as a given person’s 
aliases, age and date of birth, news stories, telephone number, gender, 
interests/affiliations, address history, education information, death 
records, relatives, employment history, marriage records, email 
address, criminal records, divorce records, civil records (including 
bankruptcies, liens, judgments), property ownership and sales history 
(including loan activity), social media information (including 
usernames, profile URL, friend connections), [and] neighbors.109 
The companies that provide people search products often perform 
sophisticated web crawls across the Internet to gather information 
                                                
106 See DATA COUP, https://datacoup.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2014); see 
also Tom Simonite, Would You Let a Startup Track Your Social Media Accounts 
and Credit Card Transactions in Exchange for Cash?, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 
12, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/524621/sell-your-personal-
data-for-8-a-month/; Tom Simonite, Datacoup Wants to Buy Your Credit Card 
and Facebook Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www. 
technologyreview.com/news/530486/datacoup-wants-to-buy-your-credit-card-and-
facebook-data/; Sam Harnett, How to Sell Your Private Data—If You Really 
Want to, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/ 
tech/how-sell-your-private-data-if-you-really-want. 
107 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 52; see, e.g., INTELIUS, http://www.intelius.com 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
108 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 52. 
109 See, e.g., id. at 53. 
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on a given subject from publicly available sources and then 
compare that data to data acquired from other data brokers to 
gauge the accuracy of their information.110   
Data brokers sell information to other data brokers, 
governmental entities, utility and energy companies, hospitality 
companies, individual consumers, insurance companies, lenders 
and financial services firms, marketers, advertisers, pharmaceutical 
companies, real estate services companies, telecommunications 
firms, attorneys, investigators, and others.111 Indeed, as informal 
discovery in civil litigation has become increasingly more 
productive since the advent of the Internet, some have proactively 
advocated for the increased use of data brokers’ products in 
facilitating pre-trial adversarial investigation. 112  Moreover, as 
                                                
110 Id. at 56. 
111 Id. at 58. While the FTC report’s graphic breaking down the types of 
products purchased by various industries indicates that currently attorneys and 
investigators are generally only purchasing direct marketing services, it is 
interesting to note that, as individual consumers frequently use people search 
services, it may be nearly impossible to accurately ascertain who the end users 
are of a given data broker product. 
112 See, e.g., Todd B. Baker, Symposium: The Internet and the Law: Informal 
Discovery on the Internet, 52 THE ADVOCATE 23, 27 (2010) (advocating for the 
employment of Intelius’ services in conducting pretrial discovery); see also 
Jayni Foley, Are Google Searches Private? An Originalist Interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment in Online Communication Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
447, 473 (2007) (“Data brokering companies now aggregate information on 
individuals and sell it to both government and private litigants.”); Corey 
Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 245, 249 n.10 (2007) 
(“For years, [data brokers] have made millions quietly selling personal 
information to law enforcement, corporations, attorneys, collection agencies and 
the news media.” (quoting Jill Burcum, Hackers’ Assaults May Prod Wave of 
Reforms: Data-Selling Industry Comes Under Scrutiny, MINNEAPOLIS STAR 
TRIBUNE, May 29, 2005, at A-1.)). “[M]any data-broker companies such as 
ChoicePoint and LexisNexis profit from the sale of [personally identifiable 
information].” Id.; see also Joseph T. Thai, Symposium: The Jurisprudence of 
Justice Stevens: Panel I: Criminal Justice: Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under 
Justice Stevens’ Fourth Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1751 (2006) 
(“Credit card companies, banks, insurers, employers, landlords, attorneys, 
detectives, angry spouses, and other private parties may avail themselves of the 
services these data brokers offer.”). 
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attorneys turn to the Internet and, increasingly, to social media to 
conduct informal discovery, the practice becomes progressively 
more accepted within the profession from an ethical standpoint, 
with some even persuasively arguing that there exists an ethical 
obligation upon attorneys to investigate an opponent’s social 
networking information.113   
Given these trends, taking the next step to the widespread 
development of commercially available algorithms to be put to 
work making deductions about human behavior, lifestyle, and 
activities from consumers’ already available digital footprints is 
not much of a stretch.114 If every link clicked indicates an interest; 
every purchase made demonstrates a trait; and the sum total of 
individuals’ data is being aggregated, bundled, and sold, the focus 
must be this: what can one realistically do with all of that 
information? The following section begins to answer this question. 
III.  THE WORLD OF BIG DATA 
“Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.”115 
There is no unified definition for the phenomenon that is “big 
data.” Contemporary writers have defined it as “the ability of 
society to harness information in novel ways to produce useful 
insights or goods and services of significant value.”116 Others have 
                                                
113 See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Ethical Limitations on Informal Discovery of 
Social Media Information, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473, 473–74 (2013). 
114  See, e,g,, WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 44 
(acknowledging the “powerful capacity on the part of the private sector to 
collect information and use that information to algorithmically profile an 
individual, possibly without that individual’s knowledge or consent[,]” and that, 
if used “nefariously, could have significant ramifications for targeted 
individuals”). 
115 See James R. Hansen, Technology and the History of Aeronautics: An 
Essay, U.S. CENTENNIAL OF FLIGHT COMM’N, http://www.centennialofflight.net/ 
essay/Evolution_of_Technology/Tech-OV1.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) (quoting 
Melvin C. Kranzberg’s First Law of the History of Technology). 
116 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see also Sean Fahey, 
The Democratization of Big Data, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 325, 325 
(2014) (defining big data, somewhat frustratingly, “as a collection of data that is 
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defined it as: 
[A] generalized, imprecise term that refers to the use of large data sets 
in data science and predictive analytics . . . . First, it refers to technology 
that maximizes computational power and algorithmic accuracy. 
Second, it describes types of analyses that draw on a range of tools to 
clean and compare data. Third, it promotes the belief that large data 
sets generate results with greater truth, objectivity, and accuracy.117 
The recent White House Big Data Report correctly noted “most 
definitions reflect the growing technological ability to capture, 
aggregate, and process an ever-greater volume, velocity, and 
variety of data.”118 Essentially, it is a field that applies algorithmic 
computer processing tools and computer-assisted deductive 
reasoning to extremely large datasets to make predictions and draw 
rational conclusions from those datasets. This was not previously 
possible until recent technological innovations both drove down 
the costs of data storage and processing while increasing processing 
power. As with any new and powerful technology, the tools of big 
data may be harnessed to serve ends either noble—such as the 
early identification of disease outbreaks—or nefarious. 
A. Predictive Analytics & Deductive Reasoning 
Like “big data,” the concept of “predictive analytics” is subject 
to more than one accepted definition. Some have defined it, simply 
enough, as “a new discipline that combines data with analysis to 
                                                                                                         
so large that it exceeds one’s capacity to process it in an acceptable amount of 
time with available tools”). 
117 Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014) 
(citations omitted). 
118 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see also Svetlana 
Sicular, Gartner’s Big Data Definition Consists of Three Parts, Not to Be 
Confused With the Three V’s, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2013/03/27/gartners-big-data-definition-consists-of-
three-parts-not-to-be-confused-with-three-vs/ (describing the so-called “three V’s” 
and defining “big data” as “high-volume, -velocity and -variety information 
assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing 
for enhanced insight and decision making”). 
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make predictions.”119 As massive amounts of data of all types can 
now be collected and organized efficiently, highly accurate 
predictions predicated on that data might now be drawn from the 
patterns that emerge.120 
Not so long ago, marketers, researchers, political analysts, and 
others seeking to research a given problem or phenomenon would 
use sampling data to arrive at a conclusion.121 For example, if 
someone wanted to know more about the political preferences and 
tendencies of a specific subcategory of the American population, 
one would submit surveys to a “sample” of several hundred 
individuals fitting the given demographic and then extrapolate 
those results to the remaining population.122 This was a reasonable 
and manageable method of studying a population and making 
deductions when costs and practical difficulties prevented 
researchers from researching or surveying all, or even most, 
members of a given population. However, with the computing 
power and storage capacity now available, it has become a 
debatable issue whether sampling continues to possess its past 
utility in the age of big data—why analyze only some of the data in 
instances where we now possess the means and the wherewithal to 
analyze all of the data?123 Despite considerable privacy concerns 
                                                
119 John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How 
Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of 
Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3052 (2014); see also Crawford & 
Schultz, supra note 117, at 98 (“By combining the use of these data sets with 
predictive analytics, Big Data can dramatically increase the amount of related 
data that may be considered private.”). 
120 See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 119. 
121 See CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 23 (describing sampling as “an 
outgrowth of an era of information-processing constraints”). 
122 See Deepa Sankar, Sampling in the Age of Big Data, SAP (Dec. 11, 2013, 
7:23 AM), http://scn.sap.com/community/business-intelligence/blog/2013/12/ 
11/sampling-in-the-age-of-big-data (noting that the typical national polling size 
is somewhere between 1000 and 1500 participants, with a margin of error of +/- 
three percentage points); see also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 12–13 
(“Since the nineteenth century, society has depended on using samples when 
faced with large numbers.”). 
123 See, e.g., CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 13 (“[T]he need for sampling 
is an artifact of a period of information scarcity, a product of the natural 
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and potential pitfalls for litigants, the newfound technological 
capability to draw meaning from information that was practically 
useless only a few decades ago has led to an astounding array of 
practical applications, some of which have undeniable societal 
value and utility. 
Google Flu Trends, for example, “uses aggregated Google 
search data to estimate flu activity” for specific geographic areas 
and regions.124 Historically, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”) have monitored flu pandemics in order for 
public health agencies to properly respond as infections develop 
and spread.125 However, a lag time of several weeks or more 
existed between an epidemic’s development in an area and the time 
when the CDC would receive reports of that epidemic from 
healthcare professionals and hospitals, delaying the CDC’s ability 
to mount a timely response.126 Google, on the receiving end of 
more than three billion search queries per day,127 found itself in a 
unique position to speed the flu-recognition process. Given the 
massive trove of data at its disposal, Google engineers wondered if 
they could anticipate flu outbreaks and track them in real time by 
analyzing Google search queries. In a 2009 paper published in the 
scientific journal Nature, Google engineers reported that, by 
comparing historical search terms with historical flu outbreak 
information provided by the CDC, they could identify correlations 
between a combination of forty-five specific search terms and flu 
                                                                                                         
constraints on interacting with information in an analog era.”); see also Steven 
Swoyer, Big Data Analytics and the End of Sampling as We Know It, 
COMPUTER WEEKLY (Aug. 2012), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/ 
Big-data-analytics-and-the-end-of-sampling-as-we-know-it. 
124 See Flu Trends, GOOGLE, http://www.google.org/flutrends/ (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2014); see also Schwartz & Solove, supra note 25, at 1868. 
125  See generally Seasonal Influenza, CENT. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu (last visited Jul. 29, 2014) (providing a hub of resources 
to help organizations combat flu outbreaks) . 
126 See CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
127 Dan Farber, Google Search Scratches Its Brain 500 Million Times a Day, 
CNET (May 13, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-search-
scratches-its-brain-500-million-times-a-day/. 
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outbreaks in discrete geographical regions.128 Thus, by analyzing 
massive amounts of seemingly random data and comparing that 
data against historically recorded phenomena, accurate predictions 
could be made about disease trends in real time. 
Consider also the possible utility of analyzing aggregated 
locational data. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) technology 
was opened to non-military uses in the 1980s and, coupled with the 
steadily decreasing cost of producing GPS modules, has ultimately 
led to the inclusion of GPS systems in everything from cell phones 
and computers to the majority of new automobiles.129 Putting this 
information to practical use and employing so-called “population 
analytics,” a company called AirSage has a website that boasts, 
“As long as a mobile phone is active on the cellular network, 
AirSage receives wireless signals and uses them to anonymously 
determine location. With AirSage’s carrier and partner 
relationships, we have nationwide coverage—more than any other 
location-based services (LBS) provider.”130 This information can 
then be used to identify traffic congestion patterns, groups of 
migrating protesters, or consumer shopping patterns, based on the 
number of devices reporting in a given area.131  
                                                
128  Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search 
Engine Query Data, 457 NATURE 1012, 1014 (Feb. 2009); see also CUKIER BIG 
DATA, supra note 4, at 2; Schwartz & Solove, supra note 25, at 1868. 
129 See CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 88–89; see also Jaclyn Trop, The 
Next Data Privacy Battle May Be Waged Inside Your Car, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/the-next-privacy-battle-may-
be-waged-inside-your-car.html (describing so-called “black boxes,” which 
“collect[] information like direction, speed and seatbelt use in a continuous loop. 
It is in nearly every car today, and in September, it is set to become 
mandatory.”). 
130 AIRSAGE, How it Works, http://www.airsage.com/Technology/How-it-
works/ (last visited Jan 3, 2015); see also Anton Troianovsky, Phone Firms Sell 
Data on Customers, WALL ST. J., (May 21, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424127887323463704578497153556847658 (“Big phone 
companies have begun to sell the vast troves of data they gather about their 
subscribers’ locations, travels and web-browsing habits.”). 
131  AIRSAGE, What We Do: See How People Move Through the Day, 
http://www.airsage.com/Technology/What-we-do/ (last visited May 20, 2014); 
see also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 90–91. 
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Despite the obvious ingenuity behind such an application of 
GPS technology, there are also clear privacy implications.132 As 
Justice Sotomayor recently stated in her concurring opinion in 
United States v. Jones, “GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects 
a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations.” 133  Though such locational 
information, if perfectly and impenetrably anonymized, may well 
pose only a small privacy risk to the individual, contemporary 
research indicates with increasing consistency that true 
anonymization is likely unattainable.134   
Law enforcement agencies around the world have also begun 
employing predictive analytic solutions to tailor specific crime 
prevention strategies. For instance, Predpol (short for “predictive 
policing”) claims to offer targeted, real-time crime prediction 
designed for and successfully tested by officers in the field.135 By 
forecasting likely future criminal activity in real-time, and basing 
its calculations on the “times and locations of previous crimes, 
combined with sociological information about criminal behavior 
and patterns,” the PredPol program recently resulted in a 19% 
reduction in burglaries in the Santa Cruz, California area; at the 
time of its introduction, the city was facing a 30% increase in 
                                                
132 See generally infra Part III.D. 
133 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private 
nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the 
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the 
criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the 
mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.” (citing People v. 
Weaver, 909 N.E. 2d 1195, 1199 (2009)). 
134 See infra notes 150–61 and accompanying text. 
135 PREDPOL.COM, http://www.predpol.com/ (last visited June 19, 2014); see 
also How Predpol Works, PREDPOL.COM, http://www.predpol.com/how-predpol-
works/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2013) (“Using only three data points—past type, 
place and time of crime and a unique algorithm based on criminal behavior 
patterns, PredPol’s powerful software provides each law enforcement agency 
with customized crime predictions for the places and times that crimes are most 
likely to occur.”). 
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crime against a 20% decrease in police staff.136 IBM also has been 
developing predictive policing software for several years now, 
“using databases of past crimes and information like timing and 
weather to identify trends and map out predictions.”137   
B. The Power of Correlation 
In order to understand how big data becomes meaningful 
information through predictive analytics, it is first necessary to 
discuss the distinction between correlation and causation. Big 
Data, the recent collaboration by Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, 
Professor of Internet Governance and Regulation at Oxford 
University, and Kenneth Cukier’s, data editor for the Economist, 
discusses the power and utility of correlative information, given a 
large enough sample size, even in the absence of causative 
understanding. 138  The Google Flu program, for instance, was 
predicated on correlative data—the search query analysis did not 
cause the flu patterns, or vice versa, but the presence of one gave 
rise to a reasonable probability of the existence of the other.139   
As an example of this phenomenon, Mayer-Schonberger and 
Cukier recount the experiences of researchers at the University of 
Ontario Institute of Technology. Working in conjunction with IBM, 
the researchers used software to capture patient vital signs—heart 
rate, blood oxygen levels, and others—in real time. Ultimately, 
they collected over a thousand data points per second to detect and 
record subtle changes in the condition of premature babies to 
detect the onset of health complications and infections in instances 
where a physician would be incapable of making such a 
deduction.140 The information reveals predictable commonalities 
among infant patients, which occur just prior to the deterioration of 
a patient’s condition. As Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier readily 
point out, this method is not diagnostic and thus does not illustrate 
                                                
136 Heather Kelly, Police Embracing Tech That Predicts Crimes, CNN (May 
26, 2014, 7:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/09/tech/innovation/police-tech/. 
137 Id. 
138 See generally CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 90–91. 
139 Id. at 53. 
140 Id. at 59–60. 
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why the infant patients are headed for trouble, only that they are.141 
Thus, by using computers to detect biological signals common to 
ailing infants, healthcare workers are able to timely allocate 
personnel and resources to monitor a patient that the data indicates 
is at risk, even in the absence of a complete understanding as to 
why he or she is at risk.142  
This is the nature of correlative study: the use of thousands of 
data points, often studied against the backdrop of actual past 
events, to create predictive models of high probabilities.143 The 
aforementioned examples of using massive quantities of data for 
such diverse purposes as monitoring real-time traffic patterns and 
predicting health failures through the analysis of thousands upon 
thousands of data points pertaining to an individual’s vital signs 
offer a brief glimpse of the power of deduction when one possesses 
enough information on a given subject. Now, given the preceding 
examples, one must consider the uses to which data brokers, 
investigators, law enforcement, attorneys, and others could put the 
massive datasets that result from the wide scale data collection 
efforts discussed in Part II. The question then becomes whether 
and to what extent datasets can be linked to a particular person and 
used to make deductions about that person’s traits, habits, medical 
conditions, political opinions, finances, sexual orientation, 
psychological conditions, and on and on. The power of aggregated 
data to identify specific individuals and to identify specific 
characteristics about them is discussed below.144 
                                                
141 Id. at 60; see also Brill, supra note 90, at 1. 
142 See also Achieving Small Miracles from Big Data, IBM, https://www. 
ibm.com/smarterplanet/global/files/ca__en_us__healthcare__smarter_healthcare_
data_baby.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2014) (describing the Artemis project). 
143 See CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 68 (“Big data turbocharges non-
causal analyses, often replacing causal investigations.”). But see WHITE HOUSE 
BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.  
144 See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL 
Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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C. The Power of Deduction: Identification, Behavior, and Propensities 
Part of the basic thesis herein—and, indeed, part of the nature 
of predictive analytics insofar as studying human behavior and 
characteristics are involved—is that the more information one has 
on a given individual, the more varied, accurate, and detailed 
predictions and deductions one can make about that individual.145 
In what is now a widely reported example of big data’s ubiquity 
and potential for invasiveness, in 2002 a statistician employed by 
Target was at work at his desk when two colleagues stopped by 
and proposed a question: “If we wanted to figure out if a customer is 
pregnant, even if she didn’t want us to know, can you do that?”146 
The desire to ascertain this information was simple—newly 
pregnant moms are looked upon as “holy grails” to marketers.147 
This is because research indicates that individuals develop buying 
habits over time, and those habits are only probable to change upon 
the occurrence of certain discrete life events, one of the most 
significant of which is the birth of a child.148  
Target researchers had discovered that expectant mothers 
exhibit a number of regular, predictable buying habits. For 
instance, while lotion is a common purchase among consumers, 
expectant mothers by and large purchase unscented lotions, and in 
great quantities, generally around the beginning of the second 
trimester.149 A careful retroactive analysis of the company’s baby 
shower registry further showed specific and predictable times at 
which expectant mothers purchased zinc, calcium and magnesium 
supplements, hand sanitizer, and an array of other products.150 
Armed with this information, based upon a woman’s buying 
patterns, the statistician was able to create a formula through which 
                                                
145 See, e.g., infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
146 Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html? 
pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp. 
147 Id. at 1 (“Their [newly pregnant moms’] shopping patterns and brand 
loyalties are up for grabs.”). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 6. 
150 Id. 
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Target was able to deduce with shocking reliability whether a 
woman was pregnant, as well as the date of conception, and her due 
date, in order to timely target the woman with key advertisements 
as her pregnancy progressed.151 This practice ultimately received 
some press attention when it culminated in an irate father storming 
into a Minneapolis-area Target and demanding an explanation as to 
why his unmarried teenage daughter was receiving mailers for 
baby clothes and cribs, only to ultimately apologize to the store 
manager after returning home to learn of his daughter’s unplanned 
pregnancy.152 Target knew that the man’s daughter was pregnant 
before he did. 
Returning for a moment to the application of predictive 
analytical models to crime prevention, the previous section 
touched upon predictive policing, generally, in terms of identifying 
where and when crimes are likely to transpire based on a historical 
analysis of the data. However, law enforcement agencies are also 
applying big data analytics to identify specific individuals whom 
the data indicates warrant additional scrutiny.153 For instance, the 
city of Chicago recently used predictive analytics to develop a list 
of several hundred individuals who fit a demonstrated “profile” for 
having a propensity for violent criminality.154 By shifting the focus 
from geography to identity, and by identifying large numbers of 
variables that are consistent amongst violent criminals, law 
enforcement officers are identifying persons for whom they have a 
“heightened awareness” based on “factors beyond charges and 
convictions.”155 While it is presently unclear to what extent these 
                                                
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 7. 
153 Although the Fourth Amendment implications of making surveillance and 
investigation decisions based on the development of data profiles are obviously 
tremendous, this issue is beyond the scope of the instant article. For further 
reading, see WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 28–31. 
154  See id. at 31 (citing Andrew G. Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive 
Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394683; Predictive Policing 
Res., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-
enforcement/strategies/predictive-policing/Pages/research.aspx). 
155 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 37. 
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techniques will be used moving forward, let alone sanctioned by 
the courts from a Fourth Amendment perspective, the Minority 
Report overtones have not gone unnoticed by either technology 
writers or privacy advocates.156   
Programs employing this technology have already been 
deployed in communities around the country. For instance, a 
majority of state parole boards now use predictions grounded in 
data analysis as a factor in determining whether an inmate should 
be paroled.157 Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Future Attribute Screening Technology (“FAST”) project analyzes 
vital signs, physiological patterns, and the like to identify those 
who are about to commit crimes.158 Intelius, one of the nation’s 
largest data brokers with access to over 600 million criminal case 
records and over 40 million defendant records, has already 
produced programs that use thousands of criminal records and 
combine that information with everything from gender, eye, and 
skin color, to traffic ticket histories and seemingly insignificant 
data such as an individual’s tattoos to create algorithms used to 
arrive at a probability of an individual’s engagement in criminal 
activity.159 
                                                
156 See Yaniv Mor, Big Data and Law Enforcement: Was “Minority Report” 
Right?, WIRED (Mar. 5, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/big-
data-law-enforcement-minority-report-right/; see also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra 
note 4, at 157–58. See Minority Report (Amblin Entm’t 2002) (telling the story 
in which a Washington, D.C., police department develops a “PreCrime” system 
wherein criminals are clairvoyantly identified, apprehended, sentenced, and 
jailed prior to having broken the law). 
157 CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 158; see also Prison Breakthrough: 
Big Data Can Help States Decide Whom to Release from Prison, THE ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21601009-big-data-
can-help-states-decide-whom-release-prison-prison-breakthrough; Attorney General 
Eric Holder’s Speech at the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th 
Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1, 
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2014/ag-speech-
140801.html (discussing the potential pitfalls of employing big data analytics at 
criminal sentencings). 
158 Mor, supra note 156. 
159 Jordan Robertson, How Big Data Could Help Identify the Next Felon—Or 
Blame the Wrong Guy, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www. 
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The accuracy of the software depends on the number of false positives 
one is willing to tolerate, a range that [Jim] Adler[, former chief 
privacy officer at Intelius] calls the “anarchy to tyranny” spectrum. At 
its most aggressive, his program can correctly identify all 51,246 felons 
[in his sample set] while misidentifying 2,220 non-felons, numbers an 
iron-fisted ruler could live with. At a more lenient setting, it can 
correctly identify 37,842 felons while misidentifying 152 
non-felons[.]160 
Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) recently 
developed the first department-wide big data capability: the dual 
pilot programs Neptune and Cerberus. 161  Neptune serves as a 
massive “data lake” into which information from an array of 
sources flows and is retained.162 As unclassified data is fed into 
Neptune, the data is tagged and sorted before being fed into 
Cerberus, which adds classified information to the mix.163 These 
programs provide the ability for investigators to, among other 
things, “perform person and characteristic searches while 
investigating a crime.”164 
The deductions that are possible are limited only by the amount 
of data that is available and the creativity of those mining it. For 
instance, recent scholarship demonstrates that an analysis of a 
user’s Facebook “likes” “can be used to automatically and 
accurately predict a range of highly sensitive personal attributes 
including: sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and political 
views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive 
                                                                                                         
bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-14/how-big-data-could-help-identify-the-next-felon-
or-blame-the-wrong-guy.html. 
160 Id. 
161 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 27. 
162  Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE NEPTUNE PILOT (Sept. 25, 2013), available at http://www. 
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-dhs-wide-neptune-09252013.pdf; 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
CERBERUS PILOT (Nov. 22, 2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/privacy-pia-dhs-cerberus-nov2013.pdf). 
163 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 n.69. 
164 Id. at 28. 
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substances, parental separation, age, and gender.”165 While many in 
the private sector have emphasized there is no reason for concern 
regarding private sector data collection because of policies which 
dictate that collected data is to be “anonymized,” recent research 
has brought that claim into question. 
D. The Myth of Anonymization 
While the privacy policies of many websites and Internet 
services state that they will only share non-personally identifiable 
information166—data which cannot be used to indicate an individual’s 
identity—the processes of “de-identification” of aggregated data are 
becoming less and less effective as re-identification strategies 
prove to be more and more successful.167 A recent White House 
report, for instance, stated: 
As techniques like data fusion make big data analytics more powerful, 
the challenges to current expectations of privacy grow more serious. When 
data is initially linked to an individual or device, some privacy-protective 
technology seeks to remove this linkage, or “de-identify” personally 
identifiable information—but equally effective techniques exist to pull 
the pieces back together through “re-identification.” Similarly, integrating 
diverse data can lead to what some analysts call the “mosaic effect,” 
                                                
165 Michael Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable 
From Digital Records of Human Behavior, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. 
OF SCIENCES (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/110/ 
15/5802.full.pdf. 
166 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/ 
privacy/ (last modified Mar. 31, 2014) (stating that it may share “aggregated, 
non-personally identifiable information publicly and with [its] partners—like 
publishers, advertisers, or connected sites”); see also Privacy & Terms: Key 
Terms, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/key-terms/#toc-
terms-info (last visited May 29, 2014) (defining “non-personally identifiable 
information” as “information that is recorded about users so that it no longer 
reflects or references an individually identifiable user”). 
167 See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 8 (citing HARVARD 
LAW PETRIE-FLOM CTR., ONLINE SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW, ETHICS, & SCIENCE OF 
RE-IDENTIFICATION DEMONSTRATIONS, PCAST REPORT, BIG DATA AND PRIVACY 
(2013), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/05/13/online-
symposium-on-the-law-ethics-science-of-re-identification-demonstrations/) “Many 
technologists are of the view that de-identification of data as a means of protecting 
individual privacy is, at best, a limited proposition.” Id. 
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whereby personally identifiable information can be derived or inferred 
from datasets that do not even include personal identifiers, bringing 
into focus a picture of who an individual is and what he or she likes.168 
Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier reached a similar conclusion, 
ultimately finding that “[g]iven enough data, perfect anonymization 
is impossible no matter how hard one tries.”169   
In 2006, AOL intentionally released the search queries of 
658,000 subscribers to the public for research purposes.170 Although 
no names or user IDs were released, AOL assigned individual 
accounts unique “identification numbers,” not dissimilar from the 
IP addresses that identify each unique Internet connection or the 
identification numbers assigned to many first- and third-party 
cookies.171 However, it was apparent almost immediately that even 
a novice researcher could deduce extremely intimate details from 
such information, including a specific user’s identity, in short 
order.172 
Two New York Times reporters at the time took it upon 
themselves to attempt to ascertain an individual’s identity from his 
or her search queries alone. User number 4417749 conducted several 
                                                
168 Id. (emphasis added). 
169 CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 155 (“Researchers have recently shown 
that not only conventional data but also the social graph—people’s connections with 
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tell your family you’re a victim of incest;” “casey middle school;” “surgical help 
for depression;” “can you adopt after a suicide attempt;” “Fishman David Dr. – 
2.6 miles NE – 160 E 34th St, New York 10016 – (212) 731-5345;” and 
“gynecology oncologists in new york city,” among others.). 
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hundred searches over the three-month period for which data was 
available, for topics such as “numb fingers,” “60 single men,” and 
“dog that urinates on everything.”173  Unaided by sophisticated 
algorithms or computer-assisted analytical tools, the reporters 
quickly found that as more and more pieces of information were 
analyzed, the easier it became to establish the user’s identity.174 
Additional searches were conducted for “landscapers in Lilburn, 
Ga,” as well as searches for several people with the last name 
Arnold and “homes sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett 
county Georgia [sic].”175 This data trail led quickly to Thelma 
Arnold, a 62-year-old widow who makes her home in Lilburn, 
Georgia.176 Indeed, the personal nature of one’s casual Internet 
activity is not to be underestimated. “Foods to avoid when breast 
feeding,” “calorie counting,” “how to kill oneself by natural gas,” 
“child porno,” “termites,” “the best season to visit Italy,” “fear that 
spouse contemplates cheating,” and “depression and medical 
leave” are just a very few examples of the many more hundreds of 
thousands of search queries detailed in the Times article.177  
                                                
173 Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 144. 
174 See also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 157 (“In order to fully 
investigate an individual, analysts need to look at the widest possible penumbra 
of data that surrounds the person—not just whom they know, but whom those 
people know too, and so on.”). 
175 Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 144. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. There is already empirical evidence that the pervasive tracking of 
Internet activity, by both private entities as well as government bodies such as 
the National Security Administration (NSA), is having a worldwide speech 
chilling effect. A recent paper by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s 
Catherine Tucker and Alex Matthews, entitled Government Surveillance and 
Internet Search Behavior, details the changes in Internet activity across 
populations globally in response to the June 2013 revelations that the NSA has 
been cooperating with major tech companies such as Microsoft, Google, and 
Yahoo! to obtain real-time data content on individual users. See Alex Matthews 
& Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior 
(Mar. 24, 2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2412564. By using Google Trends to investigate 282 search terms—the search 
terms used in the study derived from a list of search terms that DHS tracks on 
social media sites, Google’s top 50 search terms for 2013, and other potentially 
embarrassing search terms—the researchers discovered a measurable decrease in 
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Data brokers already sell data profiles on individuals to 
consumers of all types. They already comb the Internet for 
information, and purchase information from first- and third-party 
websites, and from one another. Given the ability of private 
companies to collect personal information ranging from what type 
of cologne a person bought their grandfather last Christmas to 
whether or not that person has herpes, as well as the emergence of 
the developing field of predictive analytics, the ability to create 
increasingly detailed data profiles on individuals grows by the day. 
As the products offered by data brokers become more 
sophisticated, accurate, and invasive moving forward, the value of 
this information to attorneys and their clients should not be 
underestimated. In the current, largely unregulated, environment, 
where personal information is readily sold as a commodity, the risk 
that such personal information will someday be used against a 
person increases with each day that passes, each transfer of 
personal data between parties, and each click and keystroke. As 
such, the only true protection a person has is to limit the 
information that he or she volunteers to the world, to the best that 
they are able. Furthermore, and perhaps most troubling, as 
discussed below, the only true restraints on the industry are 
self-imposed.  
IV.  THE CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
As new technologies have emerged and forced the law to 
adapt, privacy law in the United States has historically been greatly 
influenced by public opinion. For instance, in the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                         
the frequency of searches for both search terms which were either potentially 
embarrassing or likely to be flagged by the NSA. Id. at 3. These search terms 
run the gamut of everything from “abortion” and “Accutane” to “flu” and “dirty 
bomb.” Id. at 33–37. While the First Amendment implications are immediately 
apparent given the presence of empirical data demonstrating self-censorship in 
response to governmental surveillance, while also acknowledging that the issue 
of government partnership with, and hacking of, private companies to facilitate 
mass data collection further complicates the matter, such considerations are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States,178 the Court held that the 
practice of wiretapping phone lines did not infringe upon an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.179 Olmstead essentially permitted law 
enforcement officers to listen in on citizens’ telephone calls with 
impunity. Then, in 1967, the Supreme Court set forth the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test in Katz v. United States,180 and found 
that “one who occupies it, [a telephone booth] shuts the door 
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is 
surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being 
intercepted.”181 This was the result of changes in public attitudes 
about privacy, as well as technological developments in the 
intervening years between Olmstead and Katz that helped to bring 
about a change in public sentiment, which together effected a 
change in the constitutionally-protected status of Americans’ 
telephone conversations.182 These decisions are noteworthy in that 
they together demonstrate the phenomenon of slow-moving sea 
changes in the way a society and, accordingly the law, views 
complex and emerging issues that collide at the intersection of law 
and technology. 
There may never be a Katz moment for the Internet, wherein 
the High Court sweeps down to protect the rights and privacy of all 
Internet users. Indeed, attorneys charged with safeguarding the 
interests of their clients must assume that there never will be. 
Moreover, issues of user consent, difficulties in determining data 
ownership, the international nature of the Internet, implicit 
constitutional questions about individual rights, and additional 
complications not yet thought of may ultimately prove too 
problematic for a comprehensive piece of legislation or a single 
Supreme Court decision to address all attendant privacy 
                                                
178 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
179 Id. at 466. 
180 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
181 Id. at 361 (internal quotation omitted). 
182 See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1335, 1362–70 (1992) (describing the years following Katz, technological 
advances in surveillance capabilities, and changing social and political ideas 
about privacy). 
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concerns.183 Nevertheless, the attorney’s duty to provide competent 
representation remains, regardless of whether the law is able to 
keep pace with technology. 
The protection of one’s digital data privacy in the United States 
is grounded in principles of contract and tort law and subject to 
very little regulation. 184  Actions sounding in privacy or tort, 
however, have enjoyed little successful application to online data 
collection, in no small part because the privacy policies deployed 
by most websites and digital services currently operate as blanket 
customer consent forms to use an individual’s personal data as the 
holders of that data see fit.185 Thus, tort and contract remedies, as 
well as actions under the few applicable federal statutes, have had 
little practical success for parties aggrieved by private sector data 
collection practices. 
A. Privacy Policies & The Problem of Consent 
The privacy policies of virtually all websites and Internet 
services describe, generally in the vaguest possible terms, what 
data is collected and what uses are made of the data that the user 
consents to share by using that website. 186  This “notice and 
                                                
183 See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT supra note 4 n.9 (“Harvard 
Professor of Science & Technology Studies Sheila Jasanoff argues that framing 
the policy implications of big data is difficult precisely because it manifests in 
multiple contexts that each call up different operative concerns, including big 
data as property (who owns it); big data as common pool resources (who 
manages it and on what principles); and big data as identity (it is us ourselves, 
and thus its management raises constitutional questions about rights).”). 
184 See Lori Chiu, Drawing the Line Between Competing Interests: Strengthening 
Online Data Privacy Protection in an Increasingly Networked World, 14 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L L. J. 281, 282–83 (2013) (citing Carolyn Hoang, In the Middle: 
Creating a Middle Road Between U.S. and EU Data Protection Policies, 32 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 810, 818 (2012)); see also Klinefelter, supra note 
25, at 19. 
185 See, e.g., Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., No. cv-10-63-BLG-RFC, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 51930 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011); In re Google, Inc., Privacy Policy 
Litig., No. C-12-1382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171124, at *39–44, *49–51 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); see generally infra Part IV.A. 
186  See, e.g., Privacy Policy, FOX NEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/about/ 
privacy-policy (effective as of Jul. 1, 2013) (“By using Fox News Services, you 
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consent” model has been a central tenet of modern privacy law that 
has permitted individuals to determine the manner and 
circumstances in which their personal information may be shared.187 
Not surprisingly, defenses predicated on users’ consent have 
already been successfully deployed to claims mounted against data 
collectors under both tort theories and violations of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).188  
                                                                                                         
agree to the terms and conditions of this Privacy Policy.”) The policy further 
states that Fox News and its service providers collect registration information, 
public information and posts, information from social media, and activity 
information, including, for instance, IP address, browser type, geolocation data, 
and other information. Id. It also notes that Fox News does “not respond to 
browser ‘Do Not Track’ signals, as we await the work of interested stakeholders 
and others to develop standards for how such signals should be interpreted.” Id.; 
see also Full Privacy Policy, NBC UNIVERSAL, http://www.nbcuni.com/privacy/ 
full-privacy-policy/#what_information_do_we_collect_and_how_is_it_used (last 
updated May 30, 2014) (“By using the online services, you expressly consent to 
our collection, use, disclosure, and retention of your personal information as 
described in this Privacy Policy.”) NBC’s policy further describes the collection 
of information such as name, home address, age, gender, phone number, email 
address, payment information, photos or videos of users, information about 
one’s Internet connection, transaction information, “pages that you visit within 
the online services, gameplay data or other information collected through 
Cookies and Tracking Technologies[,]” and information collected from social 
networks and other publicly available data. Id. The NBC Universal policy goes 
on to state that they may “from time to time transfer your personal information 
to other countries and make it accessible to any of our affiliates and third-party 
service providers internationally.” Id.; see also Privacy Policy, BUZZFEED, 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/about/privacy (last visited Jul. 30, 2014) (describing 
its data collection practices, and then stating that, “[i]n some cases, we may 
choose to buy or sell assets. In these types of transactions, user information, 
including Personal Information, is typically one of the transferred business 
assets”).  
187 See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 49 (describing 
the notice and consent model as “the core tenet of modern privacy protection 
. . . that has been in wide use since the 1970s); CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, 
at 173 (“For decades an essential principle of privacy laws around the world has 
been to put individuals in control by letting them decide whether, how, and by 
whom their personal information may be processed.”). 
188 See, e.g., Deering, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51930, at *1 (presenting a case 
in which the plaintiff sued after the defendant-Internet service provider’s 
collected and diverted its customers’ Internet communications to third parties, 
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A related problem is the scope of consent. Privacy policies are 
broadly written so that they may be broadly construed, in large part 
because most companies in the business of collecting data today 
have no idea to what use that data could be put in the future. A 
great deal of the value offered by huge datasets comes as a 
consequence of secondary uses, sometimes only discovered 
months or years after the data was first collected. As a result, 
providing adequate notice to consumers becomes less and less 
realistic.189 Indeed, many are coming to what should have been the 
obvious conclusion that the focus of most websites’ privacy 
policies is on protecting data collection practices rather than the 
privacy of users and visitors.190 Moreover, the lingering question 
remains insofar as to what meaningful consent actually exists when 
recent research indicates that at least one Americans in every two 
erroneously believes that a privacy policy “ensures that the 
company keeps confidential all the information it collects on 
users.”191 
A related problem to the scope of consent is the frequency with 
which companies amend their terms and conditions and privacy 
policies regarding data collection. The privacy policies of many 
major websites and services are amended so often that other 
website services have sprung up for the sole purpose of monitoring 
changing website terms and conditions.192 In December 2014, for 
                                                                                                         
and the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims 
under the ECPA, as well as the claims for invasion of privacy, based on the 
plaintiff’s “consent”); see also infra Part IV.B. 
189 CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 173. 
190 See, e.g., Jose Pagliery, What You Really Agree to When You Click ‘Accept,’ 
CNN MONEY (May 19, 2014, 9:15 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/19/ 
technology/security/privacy-policy/index.html (describing most website privacy 
policies as “unintelligible”); see generally Terms and Conditions May Apply 
(Hyrax Films 2013). 
191 Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy 
Policy Is, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/ 
fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/. 
192 See Pagliery, supra note 190; see, e.g., TOSBACK, https://tosback.org/ (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2014); TERMS OF SERVICE; DIDN’T READ, http://www.tosdr.org 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
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instance, the website tosback.org, a terms of service tracking 
collaboration between the Electronic Frontier Foundation,193 the 
Internet Society,194 and ToS;DR (which is itself a tongue-in-cheek 
shorthand for “Terms of Service; Didn’t Read”),195 reported over 
forty significant changes in the terms of service or privacy policies 
of major websites, including Google, Gmail, Yahoo, LinkedIn, 
Youtube, and Flickr, among others.196 While, arguably, these constant 
alterations should diminish the legal efficacy of employing user 
consent as a defense to suits brought by consumers seeking to 
prevent companies’ data collection practices, there is little 
evidence to support that such arguments are having any success. 
Facebook’s data use policy, for instance states, “We receive 
data about you whenever you use or are running Facebook[.]”197 It 
further states, “We receive data whenever you visit a game, 
application, or website that uses Facebook Platform or visit a site 
with a Facebook feature . . . .”198 It goes on to state that “an 
advertiser may tell us information about you,” and “[w]hen we get 
your GPS location, we put it together with other location 
information we have about you . . . .”199 Similarly, Twitter’s privacy 
policy states,  
When you use our Services, we may receive information (“Log Data”) 
such as your IP address, browser type, operating system, the referring 
web page, pages visited, location, your mobile carrier, device 
information (including device and application IDs), search terms, and 
cookie information . . . . We may revise this Privacy Policy from time 
to time . . . . If we make a change to this policy that, in our sole 
discretion, is material, we will notify you . . . .200  
                                                
193 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/ (last visited May 22, 2014). 
194 INTERNET SOCIETY, http://www.internetsociety.org/ (last visited May 22, 2014).  
195 TERMS OF SERVICE; DIDN’T READ, http://tosdr.org/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
196 See TOSBACK, https://tosback.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
197 Data Use Policy à Information We Receive about You, FACEBOOK, http:// 
www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Jan. 4, 2015).  
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, twitter.com/privacy (last visited Jan. 4, 
2015). 
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Not surprisingly, Google’s Terms of Service states that by using 
Google’s services, you agree to its terms.201 Google’s privacy policy 
then states that Google “may share aggregated, non-personally 
identifiable information publicly and with [its] partners[;]” that 
Google “will share personal information with companies, organizations 
or individuals outside of Google if [it has] a good-faith belief that 
access, use, preservation or disclosure of the information is reasonably 
necessary to” comply with any legal process or enforceable 
governmental request; and that “[i]f your Google Account is 
managed for you by a domain administrator (for example, for 
Google Apps users) then your domain administrator and resellers 
who provide user support . . . will have access to your Google 
Account information (including your email and other data).”202 In 
the face of such user agreements, it is difficult to determine exactly 
which information, if any, users have not consented to disclosing. 
From the consumer’s perspective, the lack of an available common 
law cause of action capable of deterring the collection of one’s 
data is compounded by the somewhat vacuous state of legislation 
currently in place at the federal level.203 
B. Federal Law & Data Privacy 
At present, information privacy law in the United States is 
governed by a random assortment of federal and state statutes 
which focus on very specific areas—such as healthcare, credit 
reporting, and video rental records, among others—rather than by 
                                                
201 Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ 
?fg=1 (last modified Apr. 14, 2014). 
202 Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/ 
?fg=1 (last modified Dec. 19, 2014).  
203 It should be noted that, while there have been some efforts by states to 
craft effective legislation in this area, it has focused primarily on beefing up 
consumer protections in the event of data breaches. See, e.g., Florida 
Information Protection Act of 2014, Fla. S.B. 1524 (2014), available at https:// 
www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/1524/BillText/er/PDF. But see Cal. Assembly 
Bill No. 2306 (Sept. 30, 2014), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB2306 (seeking to expand the scope 
of California’s invasion of privacy statute to permit broader consumer protections). 
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any uniform legislative act or regulatory body. 204  Generally 
speaking, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) 
of 1986 is still the primary piece of federal legislation affecting 
data privacy.205 However, the ECPA was passed at a time when it 
was not uncommon for a person to pull over one’s car to use a 
payphone after one’s pager went off.206 In short, the statute is 
woefully inadequate and antiquated.  
                                                
204 See Solove, supra note 24, at 1440–44 (describing the FCRA, the Privacy 
Act of 1974, The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 
the Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) of 1984, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Video Privacy Protection Act of 
1988, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act of 1994, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) of 1996, and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 
of 1998, and concluding that, rather than following, for instance, the footsteps of 
the European Union in adopting large-scale privacy protections, “Congress has 
passed a series of statutes narrowly tailored to specific privacy problems”); 
Devin W. Ness, Note: Information Overload: Why Omnipresent Technology and 
the Rise of Big Data Shouldn’t Spell the End for Privacy as We Know It, 31 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENTM’T L.J. 925, 944 (2013). (citing Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81(u); ECPA of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 
2701-2712, 3121–3127; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; Right to Financial Privacy 
Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422; Cable Communications Policy Act of 
1984, 47 U.S.C. 521–573; and Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2710 (additional citations omitted)) (discussing Congress’ historically piecemeal 
and seemingly arbitrary approach to privacy legislation).  
205 See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 33 (stating that the 
ECPA protects stored electronic communications); see also Erica M. Scott, 
Protecting Consumer Data While Allowing the Web to Develop Self-Sustaining 
Architecture: Is a Trans-Atlantic Browser-Based Opt-In for Behavioral Tracking 
the Right Solution?, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 285, 298 
(2013) (citing Declan McCullagh, Google, Facebook Go Retro in Push to 
Update 1986 Privacy Law, CNET (Oct. 21, 2011, 8:50 AM), http://news. 
cnet.com/8301-1009_3-20004071-83.html) (stating that the ECPA, “promulgated 
in 1986, before the Internet reached beyond university campuses, is still the 
primary piece of legislation that affects data privacy on the Internet”). 
206 See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 49 (noting that, at 
the time of the ECPA’s passage, most important documents were kept in hard 
copies in the home). 
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The ECPA includes the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),207 
which addresses private data collection more closely than any 
other federal statute,208 and the Wiretap Act, which litigants have 
also attempted to use as a vehicle to challenge private sector data 
collection.209 The Wiretap Act provides that “any person whose 
wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or 
intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action 
recover from the person or entity” responsible. 210  However, 
litigants have had little success utilizing this statute, in part, 
because the statutory language only prohibits interception of the 
“contents” of a message, and courts have held that automatically 
generated data, such as geolocation information that is perpetually 
sent to service providers does not constitute “content” under the 
statute.211 This approach appears to be attaining increasing support 
among a majority of federal courts.212 This is troubling because, as 
previously discussed, such information can be subjected to 
                                                
207 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2710. 
208 See Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 399–400 (discussing the three components 
of the ECPA—the Wiretap Act, the SCA, and the Pen Register statute); see also 
Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 373, 383 (2014) (describing the SCA as “by far the most important” section 
of the ECPA).  
209 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712, 3121–3127; see, e.g., In re 
Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
210 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a); see also In re iPhone App. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 
1040, 1055, 1061–63 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
211 See In re iPhone App. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(5)) (additional citations omitted). 
212 See, e.g., In re Google, Inc., Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 
988 F. Supp. 2d 434, 443–44 (D. Del. 2013) (citing In re iPhone App. Litig., 844 
F. Supp. 2d at 1062) (“[P]ersonally identifiable information that is automatically 
generated by the communication” is not “contents” for the purposes of the 
Wiretap Act); Sams v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 10-5897, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
53202, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (holding that records identifying 
persons using Yahoo ID and email address, IP addresses, and login times were 
not content-based); In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 435-36 (E.D. 
Va. 2011) (holding that the Wiretap Act did not cover unique Internet Protocol 
(‘IP’) number, Twitter subscriber, user, and screen names, addresses (including 
e-mail addresses), telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number 
or identity, and temporarily assigned network address”). 
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algorithmic analyses to draw highly intimate conclusions about 
individuals. Other courts have refused to find liability on the part 
of third-party data collectors under the Wiretap Act, because the 
consumer-plaintiffs consented to the data collection in the first 
place through acquiescence to website terms and conditions, and 
consent constitutes a statutory exception to liability.213 
As to the SCA: without focusing too much herein on what has 
become a relatively antiquated statutory distinction between the 
providers of electronic communications services (“ECS”) versus 
providers of remote computing services (“RCS”), 214  the SCA 
addresses both the circumstances in which the government may 
compel providers to disclose information about consumers as well 
as the circumstances in which the providers may voluntarily 
disclose such information to third parties.215 Essentially, the SCA 
prohibits providers from voluntarily disclosing the contents of a 
communication subject to seven exceptions, one of which is when 
the disclosure occurs “with the lawful consent of the originator or 
an addressee.”216 The SCA also permits providers to divulge “a 
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or 
customer of such a service . . . with the lawful consent of the 
customer or subscriber.”217 Further, there is also a provision of the 
SCA that goes so far as to state that service providers may disclose 
user “records” (but not communications’ “contents”) “to any 
                                                
213 See, e.g., In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
214 A “remote computing service” is statutorily defined as “the provision to 
the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic 
communications system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). An “electronic communication 
service” is defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to 
send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15); see 
also Kerr, supra note 208, at 395–97 (describing this distinction as “obsolete,” 
while also concluding that “ECPA likely offers no protection for access to stored 
search queries . . . because it does not fit the 1986 dichotomies codified by the 
statute”). 
215 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703; see also Kerr, supra note 208, at 384. 
216 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (emphasis added). 
217 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(2); see also Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, 
Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 417 (2014) (discussing the 
limited protections available to personal metadata). 
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person other than a governmental entity.”218 Given the broad scope 
of most online privacy policies, it is not difficult to see why 
consumers have had little success in challenging private sector data 
collection practices. Moreover, while the SCA also covers the 
instances in which service providers shall turn over the content of 
users’ communications as well as the records of those 
communications to the government,219 one can see little remaining 
value in any protections provided to online activities from 
governmental intrusion when there are documented instances of 
providers such as Google voluntarily scanning users’ email 
accounts in search of evidence of criminality and then turning the 
evidence over to law enforcement.220 
Recent attempts to amend the ECPA to keep pace with 
developing technologies have stalled in Congress and, in any 
event, have focused more on updating the warrant requirement for 
law enforcement access to emails rather than addressing private 
sector data collection.221 Notably, in February of 2014, Senators 
                                                
218 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6).  
219 As to governmental acquisition of either the “contents” of an electronic 
communication, or the “records” of communications, and illustrating the 
antiquated nature of the SCA, the SCA prohibits service providers from granting 
a governmental entity access to the contents of an electronic communication, 
such as an email, without a warrant, unless the message is more than 180 days 
old. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); see also WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 
4, at 60. However, after 180 days, the government may obtain the contents of 
any electronic communications pursuant to either a simple administrative 
subpoena or a court order to an ECS provider; consumer “records” may be 
obtained with as little as an administrative subpoena, or where the subscriber has 
consented to the disclosure. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). Court orders shall issue 
upon a showing that there “are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of 
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, 
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d). 
220 See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Google Gives Child Pornography Email 
Evidence to Police, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 4, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2014/08/04/google-gives-child-pornography-email-evidence-to-police/; see also 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (providing insulation from liability for providers in cooperating 
with law enforcement). 
221 See S. 607, 113th Cong., 1st Session, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.607: (known as the “Leahy-Lee ECPA Amendments 
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John D. Rockefeller and Edward Markey introduced the Data 
Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014, which aims 
to provide consumers with the right to access to their personal files 
held by data brokers, correct inaccuracies therein, and decide for 
themselves whether they want to permit their information to be 
sold.222 However, this legislation has received little in the way of 
press attention or legislative traction since its debut.223 This has 
resulted in a situation wherein consumers wishing to prevent the 
widespread collection and analysis of their data are essentially 
without a remedy.  
For instance, in January 2000, a class action lawsuit was filed 
against DoubleClick, Inc., a Delaware corporation that was the 
largest provider of Internet advertising services in the world at the 
                                                                                                         
Act,” this bill was unanimously reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
in 2012, but has not advanced, largely due to pressure from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, as well as other governmental agencies, which lacks 
warrant authority and wishes to continue to be able to obtain emails by 
subpoena); see also Cameron F. Kerry, Microsoft Challenges the Government: 
Litigating Extraterritoriality in a Virtual World, BROOKINGS (Jul. 31, 2014, 7:30 
AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2014/07/31-microsoft-ireland-
lawsuit-kerry; Kate Tummarello, Obama’s ‘Big Data’ Report Calls for New 
Privacy Laws, THE HILL (May 1, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/ 
technology/204961-white-house-big-data-report-calls-for-new-privacy-laws; Erin 
Mershon, USA Freedom Is Out, Now What?—Buzz: Markey, Hatch to Introduce 
Bill on Student Privacy—Rockefeller Ready to Crackdown on Cramming, 
POLITICO (Jul. 30, 2014, 10:01 AM), http://www.politico.com/morningtech/ 
0714/morningtech14827.html; Julian Hattem, Tech’s Bad Year in Washington, 
THE HILL (Jan. 3, 2015, 6:11 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/227863-
techs-bad-year (describing the Email Privacy Act’s failure to even get out of 
committee). 
222 S. 2025, 113th Cong., 2D Session (2014) (staff working draft), available at 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=13d141a3-76b8-
4191-810b-ebbfd5125759; Press Release, Democratic Press Office, Rockefeller, 
Markey, Introduce Data Broker Bill to Ensure Accuracy, Accountability for 
Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=5b5b0622-1c5b-4584-
91c2-769f9b009778. 
223 See, e.g., David Lazarus, Adjusting for Life in the World of Big Data, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014, 1:37 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus-
20140826-column.html (stating that the Act “has gone nowhere in the Senate”). 
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time.224 The plaintiffs filed suit seeking injunctive and monetary 
relief for DoubleClick’s online data collection practices following 
DoubleClick’s 1999 acquisition of Abacus Direct Corporation, 
which possessed a “database of names, addresses, telephone 
numbers, retail purchasing habits and other personal information 
on approximately ninety percent of American households, which it 
sold to direct marketing companies.”225 The suit essentially sought 
to prevent DoubleClick from combining its database of online 
profiles with Abacus’ database of offline profiles “in order to 
create a super-database capable of matching users’ online activities 
with their names and addresses.”226 
Emblematic of the lack of legal tools with which the plaintiffs 
could prevent these data collection practices, the court held that the 
plaintiffs could not succeed under the SCA because they could not 
show that Doubleclick’s placement of cookies on users’ computers 
and subsequent collection of data was unauthorized.227 The court 
likewise found that the plaintiffs had no claim under the Federal 
Wiretap Act,228 because the “DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites [were] 
‘parties’ to the plaintiffs’ intercepted communications under the 
Wiretap Act and . . . they consented to DoubleClick’s interceptions.”229 
Further, the plaintiffs’ claims under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act230 (“CFAA”) failed, as the court held that the plaintiffs 
                                                
224 In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
225 Id. at 505. This lawsuit also closely followed an FTC investigation that had 
concluded that DoubleClick had violated no U.S. laws. Id. at 506. 
226 Id. at 505. 
227 Id. at 507, 513–14. 
228 See Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511 
(“[A]ny person who intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures 
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication . . . shall be punished . . . .”).  
229 Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall 
not be unlawful . . . for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, 
oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the 
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior 
consent to such interception . . . .”). 
230 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
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could not possibly allege the statutory damages threshold with 
regard to any particular computer.231   
This type of failure has been the rule rather than the exception 
in lawsuits filed by consumers attempting to challenge the current 
state of online data collection. In Kirch v. Embarq Management 
Company,232 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant-Internet service provider 
(“ISP”), finding that the ISP did not “intercept” the plaintiffs 
communications under the Wiretap Act in part because the ISP’s 
funneling of the plaintiffs’ information to an advertiser was carried 
out in the “ordinary course of its business,” thus placing the 
activity outside of the statutory definition of “interception”—
another exception.233 The district court therein had also found that, 
in any event, the plaintiffs would have been unable to recover 
because they had consented to the data collection via the Terms of 
Service agreement with the ISP.234   
In In re iPhone Application Litigation,235 the court, relying in 
part on the Doubleclick decision, dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims 
under the SCA on four independent grounds, and dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims under the Wiretap Act, finding that geolocation 
and other data being collected did not constitute the “contents” of 
communications under the statute.236 The court then dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claims for invasion of privacy stating, “the information 
allegedly disclosed to third parties included the unique device 
identifier number, personal data, and geolocation information from 
Plaintiffs’ iDevices. Even assuming this information was 
transmitted without Plaintiffs’ knowledge and consent, a fact 
disputed by Defendants, such disclosure [did] not constitute an 
                                                
231 Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
232 702 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2012). 
233 Id., aff’g Kirch v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., 10-2047-JAR, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 92701, at *26 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2011). 
234 Kirch, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92701, at *24–29. 
235 In re iPhone App. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
236 Id. at 1056–62. 
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egregious breach of social norms” and thus did not satisfy the third 
prong for invasion of privacy under California law.237 
The In re Google, Incorporated, Privacy Policy Litigation238 
plaintiffs sued challenging Google’s 2012 privacy policy changes 
wherein Google began combining user information across all of its 
services.239 The court began by noting that, while the plaintiffs’ loss of 
their personally identifiable information was not sufficient to establish 
injury-in-fact for standing purposes, their allegations of economic and 
statutory injuries did establish standing.240 Nevertheless, citing Kirch, 
the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Wiretap Act 
because Google had transmitted the plaintiffs’ information in the 
ordinary course of business.241 Then noting that “[t]he SCA is not a 
catchall statute designed to protect the privacy of stored Internet 
                                                
237 Id. at 1063. Subsequently, the plaintiffs’ class action claims for violations 
of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1784, 
and California’s Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§§ 17200-17209, were dismissed for lack of standing because the court found 
that the plaintiffs had failed to show causation, although the court stopped short 
of stating that Apple’s privacy misrepresentations did not constitute an injury in 
fact. See generally In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-2250-LHK, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169220, at *1, 74 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013). 
238 In re Google, Inc., Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-1382-PSG, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 171124 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). 
239 Id. at *5–6.  
240 Id. at *28. Several courts have also been willing to find that standing 
existed in instances where plaintiffs sought damages for the collection of 
personal data when those claims were made in conjunction with a data breach on 
the part of the data-holder. See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer 
Data Security Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (finding 
standing where the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged a ‘credible threat’ of 
impending harm based on the disclosure of their Personal Information following 
the intrusion”). 
241 Id. at *30–37. But see In re Google, Inc., Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-2430-
LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784, at *1, 58 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) 
(presenting a case in which plaintiffs’ state and federal wiretapping claims 
against Google, based on Google’s practice of scanning emails and using 
customer data to create user profiles and using that data in a manner unrelated to 
its providing of its services, survived a motion to dismiss in part because the 
ordinary course of business exception to the Wiretap Act did not apply when 
Google violated its own privacy policy).  
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communications,” 242  the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims 
under the SCA because: (1) Sec. 2701(c) of the SCA exempts 
“conduct authorized by the person or entity providing a wire or 
electronic communications service” from criminal punishment; and 
(2) the plaintiffs had equivocated in their allegations under Sec. 
2702 regarding whether or not Google had actually disclosed the 
plaintiffs’ information to third parties, thus failing to state a 
claim. 243  The court then dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for 
misappropriation of likeness and intrusion upon seclusion based on 
the users’ consent, and similarly dismissed the plaintiffs’ breach of 
contract claims.244 
The case law indicates that users wishing to either enjoin 
private sector data collection practices or recover monetary damages 
resulting from those practices have been largely unsuccessful. Tort 
and contract claims quickly encounter insurmountable consent 
issues insofar as pleading a cognizable claim is concerned. Claims 
under the ECPA routinely fail both because of the aforementioned 
consent issue, and because the ECPA is riddled with exceptions.245 
Lacking comprehensive congressional action, or the emergence of 
radically creative judicial applications of the ECPA, consumers are 
left without a remedy. However, though certainly not a systemic 
solution, the FTC’s recent efforts at curbing unfair and deceptive 
practices in this regard are nevertheless noteworthy. 
C. Federal Trade Commission Involvement 
The FTC recently called upon Congress to “enact[] legislation 
that would enable consumers to learn of the existence and activities 
of data brokers and provide consumers with reasonable access to 
                                                
242 In re Google, Inc., Privacy Policy Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171124, at 
*38 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 
and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214 
(2004)). 
243 Id. at *37–39. 
244 Id. at *39–44, 49–51. See also In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 
1109 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims under both the SCA and 
the Wiretap Act). 
245 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c). 
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information about them held by these entities.”246 It also recommended 
providing consumers with the ability to “opt out” of having their 
information shared.247 Of particular note, given the previous discussion 
regarding predictive analytics as applied to the individual, the FTC 
report also stated: 
[T]o further enhance transparency, the Commission recommends that 
Congress consider legislation requiring data brokers to clearly disclose 
to consumers (e.g., on their website) that they not only use the raw data 
that they obtain from their sources, such as a person’s name, address, 
age, and income range, but that they also derive certain inferences from 
the data.248 
Despite the absence of effective legislation, FTC enforcement 
has achieved some degree of success in its efforts to improve 
transparency and limit some of the more egregious collection 
practices used by data brokers.249 In 2009, for example, the FTC 
settled a complaint lodged against Sears Holdings Management 
Corporation that charged that Sears failed to disclose the scope of 
its tracking and collection of consumers’ personal information.250 
This stemmed from Sears’s invitation to consumers to become 
members of the “My SHC Community” in which consumers were 
enticed to participate by Sears’ offer of ten dollars to each 
participant.251 While participation in the “My SHC Community” 
program asked consumers to download “research” software that 
was billed as confidentially tracking online browsing, the FTC 
alleged that consumers were not informed that the software would 
also collect information from consumers’ online shopping carts, 
online bank statements, drug prescription records, email histories, 
                                                
246 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at vii. 
247 Id. at viii; see generally CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 156 (describing 
“opting out” as one of three generally recognized privacy strategies, alongside 
notice and consent, and anonymization). 
248 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 52 (emphasis added). 
249 See Federal Trade Comm’n Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a),(n).  
250 See Press Release, FTC, Sears Settles FTC Charges Regarding Tracking 
Software (Jun. 4, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2009/06/sears-settles-ftc-charges-regarding-tracking-software) [hereinafter 
Sears Press Release]. 
251 Id. 
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and the like.252 The final settlement required Sears to make specific 
disclosures to consumers as to precisely what data was being 
collected and the purpose for which it would be used. It also 
required Sears to delete all data that was collected during the 
program.253 
In 2011, Facebook settled claims brought by the FTC on 
charges that Facebook’s privacy practices were “unfair and 
deceptive.”254 Among the listed violations of Facebook’s privacy 
promises to customers set forth in the FTC complaint were 
allegations that Facebook: (1) had promised users it would not 
share personal information with advertisers, although it did; (2) 
had a “Verified Apps” program in which it represented that 
Facebook had certified the security of participating apps when it 
had not; and (3) “claimed that when users deactivated or deleted 
their accounts, their photos and videos would be inaccessible. But 
Facebook allowed access to the content, even after users had 
deactivated or deleted their accounts.”255  
Similarly, in 2012, Google settled with the FTC, agreeing to 
pay a record $22.5 million penalty to settle charges that it 
“misrepresented to users of Apple Inc.’s Safari Internet browser 
that it would not place tracking ‘cookies’ or serve targeted ads to 
those users, violating [the] earlier privacy settlement between the 
company and the FTC.”256 Likewise, in May of 2014, the FTC 
reached a settlement agreement with Snapchat, a popular app that 
                                                
252 Id. 
253 Id.; see also G.S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC 
Enforcement: Broadening Unfairness Regulation for a New Era, 19 MICH. 
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 163, 173–75 (2012) (discussing the FTC enforcement 
action against Sears). 
254 Press Release, FTC, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived 
Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-
charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep. 
255 Id. 
256 Press Release, FTC, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges 
It Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet 
Browser (Aug. 9, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented. 
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“billed itself as a way of sending messages—snaps—which would 
self-destruct within a set timeframe after being viewed by the 
recipient, over violations of Snapchat’s promises regarding the 
“ ‘ephemeral’ nature of ‘snaps.’ ”257 Snapchat’s violations received 
additional attention in November 2014, when a massive hack 
dubbed the “Snappening” resulted in the release of “a database 
containing over 100,000 images and videos sent across Snapchat 
leaked online for the titillation of the masses.”258 
In addition to the successes of the FTC in combating alleged 
deceptive and unfair practices within the big data industry, the 
FTC has been among the most vocal advocates for comprehensive 
Congressional action to increase transparency within the data 
broker industry. 259  Despite these successes, the overwhelming 
consensus is that current privacy laws are woefully inadequate to 
deal with the phenomenon that massive data collection—let alone 
the practice of predictive analytics—represents.  
D. Executive Involvement and the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
For its part, the White House appears to support the efforts of 
the FTC, at least publicly. In 2012, the Obama administration 
released a report that set forth the so-called Consumer Privacy Bill 
of Rights (“CPBR”). 260 Based largely on the Fair Information 
                                                
257  See Press Release, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of 
Disappearing Messages Were False, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 8, 2014), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-
settles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were; see also Charlie Osborne, 
FTC Finalizes Charges Against Snapchat Over User Privacy, ZDNET (Jan. 2, 
2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/ftc-finalizes-charges-against-snapchat-over-
user-privacy/. 
258 Charlie Osborne, supra note 257. 
259 See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at vii. 
260 See generally EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA 
PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY 
AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (Feb. 2012), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf 
[hereinafter CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY REPORT]. 
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Practice Principles,261 this proposed legislative initiative focuses on 
several key areas, such as increased individual control for 
consumers in terms of what personal data is collected from them 
by private companies, and increased transparency so that 
customers are provided with easily understandable information 
regarding privacy and security policies.262 The CPBR also seeks to 
establish a consumer right to ensure that companies handle their 
data in a secure manner, while also addressing several other areas, 
including an increased focus on providing consumers with the 
ability to access and correct personal data “in a manner that is 
appropriate to the sensitivity of the data and the risk of adverse 
consequences to consumers if the data is inaccurate.”263   
Although at the time of its release the report stated that 
“[s]trengthening consumer data privacy protections in the United 
States is an important Administration priority[,]”264 and the subsequent 
2014 White House Report on Big Data similarly recommended 
amending the ECPA,265 as of this writing there has been little in the 
way of serious legislative attempts at implementation. However, 
while it is noteworthy that the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
recently requested public “comment on ‘big data’ developments 
and how they impact the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights,” it was 
unclear at the conclusion of the public comment period what, if any, 
efforts at implementation would likely follow.266 Unsurprisingly, 
                                                
261 Commonly known as the “FIPPs,” the Fair Information Practice Principles 
emerged from recommendations made by the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare in its 1973 report entitled Records, Computers, and the 
Rights of Citizens. See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 17. 
262 CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 260, at 1. 
263 Id. It is noteworthy, and somewhat ironic, that one of the key goals of what 
is intended to be a privacy-enhancing proposal—empowering consumers to 
correct false information held by data brokers—requires consumers to give data 
brokers more information about themselves. 
264 Id. at 5. 
265 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 60. 
266 Big Data and Consumer Privacy in the Internet Economy, 79 Fed. Reg. 
32714 (June 6, 2014), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ 
big_data_rfc.pdf; see also Alexei Alexis, NTIA Leads Privacy Bill of Rights 
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the data broker industry opposes the implementation of the 
CPBR.267 
In the meantime, the data broker industry has largely been 
subject to self-regulation.268 In the absence of effective legislation 
governing Internet privacy policies, the recent White House Report 
on Big Data described the “self-regulatory” nature of the current 
regime, stating that “companies agree to a set of principles when 
engaged in ‘behavioral’ or multisite advertising where they collect 
information about user activities over time and across different 
websites in order to infer user preferences.” 269  However, 
self-regulation is problematic as the primary protection offered to 
consumers. The industry has already racked up a less-than-laudable 
track record of deceptive privacy policies, violations of existing 
privacy policies, and settlements with the FTC for unfair or 
deceptive business practices. Additionally, the Do Not Track 
initiative has largely failed because of websites’ unwillingness to 
honor consumer requests. The prudent consumer, or attorney, is 
one who assumes that self-regulation is ultimately a failing 
proposition.   
The same White House Report also notes the “privacy fatigue” 
that is commonly experienced as a symptom of having to wade 
through a seemingly endless barrage of legalese to use a given 
service.270 As much of the data collection industry’s power stems 
                                                                                                         
Review in Light of ‘Big Data’ Trend, BNA (June 4, 2014), http://www. 
bna.com/ntia-leads-privacy-n17179891045/. 
267 See, e.g., Jennifer Glasgow, Does the US Need the Privacy Bill of Rights 
Enacted Into Law?, ACXIOM (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.acxiom.com/us-need-
privacy-bill-rights-enacted-law/. 
268  See, e.g., Perry Simpson, White House Supports Self-Regulation in 
Data-Driven Marketing, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS (May 2, 2014), http://www. 
dmnews.com/white-house-supports-self-regulation-in-data-driven-marketing/article/ 
345388/; see also Glasgow, supra note 267. 
269 WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 41. 
270 Id. at 42 (citing Sarah Kidner, Privacy Fatigue Hits Facebook: Have You 
Updated Your Settings?, WHICH? CONVERSATION, (Oct. 18, 2011), http:// 
conversation.which.co.uk/technology/facebook-privacy-settings-privacy-fatigue/; 
Aleecia McDonald & Lorrie Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 
INFORMATION SOCIETY: A JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION 
 
MAR. 2015] Big Data & the Duty of Competence 595 
from the consent garnered from consumers as a result of their 
unwillingness to read, or inability to comprehend, such policies, 
this is further reason for skepticism as to the long-term success of a 
system of self-regulation. To be fair, however, this result—
generalized malaise, rather than mass public outrage—is likely at 
least partially related to shifting societal norms regarding what is 
or is not “creepy” in terms of privacy and data collection and 
dissemination in the digital age.271 
E. Additional Considerations: A Symptom of the Disease—
Permanent Retention and Creative Discovery Practices 
A byproduct of the universal realization of the enduring value 
of data is the widespread and prolonged retention of that data, 
which in some cases may represent a veritable treasure trove of 
information, discoverable or otherwise, that may never be 
deleted.272 As companies like Google, Facebook, and countless 
others have developed policies wherein they save practically 
everything that users do online,273 it should be noted that this trend 
                                                                                                         
SOCIETY, 545, 545, 564 (2008)); see also Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The 
No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546 
(2014) (describing the ubiquitous phenomenon of customers’ routine failure to 
read form contracts offered by providers of goods and services, leading to 
problems of consumer consent and a lack of competitive pressure on business to 
improve the contractual terms offered to customers). 
271 See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, 
Privacy and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 72–73 (2014) 
(describing changing privacy norms and stating that the advent of caller ID in 
the 1980s was widely regarded as “creepy” and resulted in some attempts at 
regulation at the state level as critics considered it a privacy violation to see who 
was calling in to, for instance, an HIV help line, or a drug or alcohol clinic. This 
concern, however yielded in the face of changing norms, and “[t]oday, many 
users would not answer the phone if the number were not listed. What was 
initially considered a privacy violation is now considered a privacy-enhancing 
technology.”). 
272 See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 22. 
273 See also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 174 (advocating for limited 
time frames for data retention and reuse, stating that such an approach would 
“banish[] the specter of ‘permanent memory’—the risk that one can never 
escape one’s past because the digital records can always be dredged up”); see, 
e.g., Privacy & Terms, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/ 
 
596 N.C. J.L. & TECH.  [VOL. 16: 527 
  
has not gone unnoticed in either criminal or civil litigation. 
Individual users’ search queries have already been the subject of 
governmental, private, and international discovery.274 “Government 
agencies, courts and parties in civil litigation regularly ask 
technology and communications companies for information about 
how a person has used the companies’ services.”275 Google’s most 
recent transparency report notes that government requests for user 
information has increased 120% since Google first began 
publishing such numbers in 2009.276  
Equally troubling is the persuasive suggestion by some 
scholars that the current legal landscape makes it unclear the extent 
to which the SCA prevents a party in civil litigation from obtaining 
communications maintained by cloud services providers as part of 
civil discovery. Even communications deleted by users may be 
recoverable. The SCA may allow discovery of such communications 
despite the fact that the SCA does not on its face authorize service 
providers to make such disclosures for the purposes of civil 
discovery. 277  In Flagg v. City of Detroit, 278  the defendant-City 
argued that the SCA precluded the production in civil litigation of 
electronic communications that had been previously deleted by the 
users but had nevertheless been stored by a non-party service 
                                                                                                         
privacy/?fg=1 (last modified Dec. 19, 2014) (describing what is collected, and 
also stating that “after you delete information from our services, we may not 
immediately delete residual copies from our active servers and may not remove 
information from our backup systems”). 
274 See Ron A. Dolin, Search Query Privacy: The Problem of Anonymization, 
2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 137, 137 (2010); see also ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 
F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 
(N.D. Cal. 2006); see generally Foley, supra note 112, at 451–54 (discussing the 
use of subpoenas to acquire records of one’s Internet activities in criminal 
litigation). 
275 Google Transparency Report—Requests for User Information: Legal Process, 
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/legalprocess/ 
(last visited June 26, 2014). 
276 Access to Information, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ 
(last visited June 26, 2014). 
277 See Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 415. 
278 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
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provider.279 After a thorough analysis of the applicable provisions 
of the SCA, the court concluded that the information held by the 
third party could be produced via a Rule 34 280  request for 
production directed to the defendant-City itself, rather than the 
third party.281 The court reasoned that the defendant maintained 
“control” over that information because the issuance of its consent 
to the third party would allow the third party to disclose the 
“deleted” communications under the SCA.282 Similarly, in Thayer 
v. Chiczewski,283 the court first acknowledged “most courts have 
concluded that third parties cannot be compelled to disclose 
electronic communications pursuant to a civil—as opposed to 
criminal—discovery subpoena . . . .” Nevertheless, the court, 
applying reasoning similar to that found in Flagg, ordered 
third-party America Online (“AOL”) to turn over its records of the 
plaintiff’s previously deleted emails, because the subpoena in 
question sought “documents that [the plaintiff] would be required 
to produce if he had not deleted them from his email accounts.”284  
                                                
279 Id. at 347. 
280 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) which states: 
A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of 
Rule 26(b): 
(1) to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative 
to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the 
responding party’s possession, custody, or control: 
(A) any designated documents or electronically stored information 
. . . stored in any medium . . . .  
Id. 
281 See Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 353. 
282 See id. at 352–53 (citations omitted) (stating that Rule 34 requests for 
production “may properly extend to items that are in that party’s ‘control.’” 
Then, after finding that electronic information may be said to be within a party’s 
control when it is “maintained by a third party of [a] company’s behalf[,]” the 
court found that such information may be obtained in discovery in civil 
litigation). But see Bower v. Mirvat El-Nady Bower, 808 F. Supp. 2d 348, 349 
(D. Mass. 2011) (denying the plaintiff’s attempts to produce the defendant’s 
emails, lacking the defendant’s consent, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
283 No. 07-C-1290, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84176 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2009). 
284 Id. at *15; see also Negro v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th 879, 883 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that the lower court’s imputation of consent on the 
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These cases stand for the proposition that, even if the SCA 
prevents entities like Facebook, Google, or Yahoo! from opening 
up their data vaults in response to Rule 45 subpoenas without a 
user’s consent, courts are increasingly willing to order litigants to 
request copies of electronic records and communications from 
providers themselves pursuant to Rule 34. This practice sidesteps 
the consent requirement and, for all intents and purposes, the few 
remaining privacy protections of the SCA altogether. This is 
significant because, if courts interpret electronic information stored 
in the cloud—search query histories, websites visited, emails 
previously deleted by users, etc.—as perpetually within the 
custody or control of the consumer due to the consumer’s ability to 
consent to disclosure by third parties, and third parties retain user 
information forever, then courts can simply order litigants to 
request this information from service providers pursuant to a 
Rule 34 subpoena.285 Such an interpretation potentially places an 
individual’s entire Internet history into play in future civil 
litigation, which may contain discoverable information itself, be 
used to lead to discoverable information, or be used as fuel for 
predictive analytical machinery. 
                                                                                                         
part of the petitioner was improper, but nevertheless finding that consent existed 
where petitioner had been ordered by a Florida court to give his express consent 
to a third-party service provider—in this case Google—and he had done so, 
thus, the SCA did not protect petitioner’s emails); Jake Vandelist, Status 
Update: Adapting the Stored Communications Act to a Modern World, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 1536, 1547–48 (2014) (collecting cases, and discussing the use of 
discovery requests served on users rather than providers as an end-run around 
the SCA). 
285 See FTC v. Sterling Precious Metals, L.L.C., No. 12-80597-CIV, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50976 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2013); see also Doe v. City of San 
Diego, No. 12-cv-689-MMA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74802, at *12–13 (S.D. 
Cal. May 28, 2013) (finding that, while the SCA prohibited Verizon from 
disclosing customer records to a subpoena issued by the City of San Diego, “the 
City [was] permitted to seek Plaintiff’s cell phone records by serving a request 
for production of documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34”). 
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V.  AN ATTORNEY’S DUTY OF COMPETENCE—NEW ETHICAL 
OBLIGATIONS ARISE IN THE WAKE OF RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Just as Intelius’s predictive models could accurately predict 
individual criminality, 286  so too can data brokers use similar 
processes to make other predictions and deductions about 
individuals that possess practical utility in conducting opposition 
research for litigants. Data brokers already sell “people search” 
products containing personal information to whomever wishes to 
purchase them, which one could reasonably argue demonstrates a 
certain industry-wide comfort with selling sensitive personal 
information at retail. Add to this state of affairs the aforementioned 
mass storage of online activities due to increases in both storage 
capacity and the value of data, and a conclusion begins to emerge 
that technological advances are leading to the rise of an affirmative 
ethical and professional duty for attorneys to instruct and educate 
their clients on responsible, preferably anonymous, use of the 
Internet.  
It seems the only thing standing in the way of the widespread 
commercial availability of publicly accessible profiles detailing 
everything from a litigant’s proclivity for criminality or existing 
mood or mental disorders to the health of his or her spouse or the 
financial circumstances in a given household is the will to create it. 
There is no reason why algorithms could not be tasked with 
processing existing data to assess whether someone is rich or poor, 
faithful or lecherous, healthy or sick, trustworthy or false, 
politically active or apathetic, sober or otherwise, or engaged in 
any manner of malfeasance or criminality.287 The problem with 
relying on a self-regulatory regime is that, under such a regime, the 
only true check on data brokers’ activities is public outrage.  
                                                
286 See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
287 See, e.g., Jennifer Golbeck, Smart People Prefer Curly Fries, SLATE (Oct. 
7, 2014, 7:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/ 
10/youarewhatyoulike_find_out_what_algorithms_can_tell_about_you_based_on_
your.html (discussing the use of algorithmic analyses to make intimate and 
personal deductions from innocuous bits of social media data); see also 
Robertson, supra note 159; Kosinski, supra note 165. 
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However, if the past two decades have been any indication, the 
public’s capacity for outrage and indignation at digital privacy 
intrusions may be waning.288 If the public’s comfort with intrusive 
private sector surveillance is increasing, while the principal check 
on data broker activities is public sentiment, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the likelihood of “people search” products becoming 
progressively more detailed and invasive in the years ahead 
represents an unacceptably high risk to litigants. When one 
considers that information, once disseminated, remains in the 
digital world forever, it will be too late to avoid falling victim to 
such investigative tactics in the future unless individuals stop the 
information seepage today. 
The Internet’s relatively recent assumption of its role as a tool 
central to the practice of law has brought with it increasingly 
complex ethical questions for attorneys as they attempt to navigate 
new and uncertain issues in the digital marketplace.289 For instance, 
Google’s practice of digitally scanning the contents of its users’ 
emails in order to deliver more accurately targeted ads initially led 
to difficult questions in terms of third-party disclosures and the 
possible waiver of attorney-client confidentiality.290 Further, some 
                                                
288 See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
289 See, e.g., Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Motorcycle Information Network, 
Inc., No. 5:04-cv-12-oc-10GRJ, 2008 WL 906739, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 
2008) (noting that, “[i]ndeed, the failure to use computerized legal research may 
be a basis for a claim of malpractice in some instances.”). 
290 See, e.g., Shellie Stephens, Going Google: Your Practice, The Cloud, and 
the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 237, 239 
(2011) (describing cloud computing’s impact on an attorney’s obligations under 
Rule 1.6); see also N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n, Op. 820 (2008), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=5222; Google Terms 
of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last visited 
June 16, 2014) (“Our automated systems analyze your content (including 
emails) to provide you personally relevant product features, such as customized 
search results, tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection. This 
analysis occurs as the content is sent, received, and when it is stored.”); see 
generally Timothy Peterson, Cloudy With a Chance of Waiver: How Cloud 
Computing Complicates the Attorney-Client Privilege, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
383 (2012) (discussing waiver of privilege through use of cloud-based computer 
services). 
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scholars have persuasively argued that the phenomenon of the 
online tracking of attorneys as they conduct online legal research 
could be said to “produce a limited or general disclosure that 
constitutes a waiver of both attorney-client and work product and 
violates the attorney’s ethical commitment to confidentiality.”291 
Generally, the prudent attorney should advise against a client’s 
needless dissemination of vast amounts personal information that 
could potentially be used by another to the client’s detriment. 
Advocating for individuals to protect personal information because 
it could at some point in the future be used against them is not in 
and of itself a novel suggestion nor is it a novel interpretation of 
the attorneys’ duty of competence to suggest that this duty places 
an obligation upon lawyers to advise their clients regarding the 
potential pitfalls of recklessly circulating intimate details of their 
personal lives in the digital realm.292 For instance, a recent New 
York County Lawyer’s Association ethics opinion’s topic 
addressed “[w]hat advice is appropriate to give a client with 
respect to existing or proposed postings on social media sites.”293 
Noting that personal injury defendants, rather than hiring private 
investigators, have with increasing frequency turned to YouTube, 
Facebook, and other social media websites in order to research the 
activities of their opponents in litigation, the opinion stated that an 
attorney’s obligation to competently represent clients under Rule 
1.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct could give rise to an 
obligation to advise clients in terms of how their position might be 
adversely affected by their use of social media.294 Most of the bar 
associations that have addressed this issue thus far concur.295 Thus, 
                                                
291 Klinefelter, supra note 25, at 22. 
292 See, e.g., NYCLA Opinion, supra note 2; NYSBA Opinion, supra note 2; 
PBA Opinion, supra note 2; Penn. Opinion, supra note 2; NCB Opinion, supra 
note 2. 
293 NYCLA Opinion, supra note 2, at 1.  
294 Id. at 3. This consideration is of course tempered by legal duties to refrain 
from suppressing or concealing evidence, as well as issues of spoliation, under 
applicable law. 
295 See, e.g., NYSBA Opinion, supra note 2; see also PBA Opinion, supra 
note 2 (concurring with the conclusions of the New York State Bar Association 
in stating that attorneys may advise clients regarding the removal of potentially 
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an attorney’s obligation to prevent a client from needlessly 
exposing personal details of his life to the world, which could 
potentially be used against him by his adversaries in the course of 
litigation, is not new. It is an obligation that stems directly from the 
attorney’s duty of competence. For attorneys, however, it is a 
constantly evolving obligation and fast moving technological 
advancements significantly complicate the attorney’s task. 
Few, if any, standards of attorney competence currently exist, 
however, with regard to advising clients as to how to safely browse 
the Internet, as well as how to generally conduct personal matters 
and business affairs online in the era of big data, and in an 
environment in which every click and keystroke is recorded, 
personal Internet activity data is being commoditized and sold, and 
the science of predictive analytics is developing with increasing 
rapidity.296 Given the rate at which personal information is being 
                                                                                                         
damaging information from social media subject to the obligations to preserve 
evidence).  
296 See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 37 (“Controversially, 
predictive analytics can now be applied to analyze a person’s individual 
propensity to criminal activity,” and describing how police forces in the United 
States are “shift[ing] the focus of predictive policing from geographical factors 
to identity”); Mandi Woodruff, The Secret Way Companies Are Using Big Data 
to Score You, YAHOO FINANCE (Apr. 2, 2014, 10:13 AM), https://finance.yahoo.com/ 
news/the-secret-way-companies-are-using-big-data-to-score-you-135018683.html 
(describing the commoditization of personal information culled by an individual’s 
internet activity to create credit “scores” not subject to the FCRA); Brad 
Howarth, Big Data: How Predictive Analytics is Taking Over the Public Sector, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 13, 2014, 7:55 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2014/jun/13/big-data-how-predictive-analytics-is-taking-over-the-public-sector 
(describing the Australian government’s use of big data analytics to, among 
other things, predict emergency room admissions on a given day with 93% 
accuracy; and identify tax havens and businesses failing to meet compliance 
obligations); Rebecca Merrett, NSW Police Force Sees Opportunities in 
Predictive Analytics, CIO (May, 30, 2014, 1:20 PM), https://www.cio.com.au/ 
article/546402/nsw_police_force_sees_opportunities_predictive_analytics/ (describing 
the implementation of predictive analytic models by law enforcement to deploy 
resources proactively); Ger Daly, Embracing the Police Force of the Future, CNN 
(Sept. 19, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/tech/innovation/ 
police-future-technology/index.html?iref=allsearch (describing the use of data 
mining and predictive analytics to “predict patterns of future criminal 
 
MAR. 2015] Big Data & the Duty of Competence 603 
collected, analyzed, and sold as well as the potential value of such 
personal information in the context of civil litigation, attorneys 
may be falling short of their ethical obligations if they do not at the 
very least avail clients of current best practices and options 
available to them insofar as anonymous Internet browsing and 
safeguarding their personal data is concerned. The most recent 
addition to Rule 1.1 is a step in that direction. 
Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct addresses 
attorney competency.297 The rule states “[a] lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent representation 
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”298 The difficulty for 
attorneys is that what constitutes “preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation” of a given client is quickly 
changing in the wake of swift technological advancements. 
Comment 8 to Rule 1.1 has recently been added to provide that: 
[In order t]o maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer 
should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the 
benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in 
continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal 
education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.299 
With this obligation in mind, as well as the foregoing discussion 
regarding the ubiquity of privatized data collection and the 
developing field of predictive analytics, the question is this: Does 
an attorney have an ethical obligation insofar as advising clients 
regarding their day-to-day Internet usage? If an obligation exists to 
                                                                                                         
behavior”); Edith Ramirez, The Secret Eyes Watching You Shop, CNN (May 30, 
2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/30/opinion/ramirez-data-brokers-ftc/ 
index.html?iref=allsearch (describing collection and analysis by data brokers, 
and stating that “[d]ata brokers scoop up the digital breadcrumbs we leave as we 
shop in stores and online, and apply ‘big data’ analytical tools to predict where 
we’re going, what we’ll buy, and what we’ll do next—sometimes even before 
we know ourselves what we’ll buy next.”). 
297 See generally ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. at R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (emphasis added); see also id. at R 1.0(h) (“‘Reasonable’ 
or ‘reasonably’ when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct 
of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.”). 
604 N.C. J.L. & TECH.  [VOL. 16: 527 
  
discuss with clients what Facebook posts a client should think 
twice about, and an attorney perceives a likelihood (or even a 
chance) that the totality of a client’s accrued daily Internet activity 
over time could ultimately be used to yield far more information 
than any single post to social media, should an obligation not also 
exist to advise the client in terms of how to prevent irresponsible 
web browsing? 
Bar associations are rushing to keep pace with evolving ethical 
obligations in the face of rapid technological advances, and the 
tendency is to advise attorneys to err on the side of caution. For 
instance, in 2011, grounding its analysis in rules 1.6(a)300 and 1.1301 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA released an 
ethics opinion that concluded that unencrypted email communications 
between attorney and client were likely permissible under Rule 1.6 
because there was “a reasonable expectation of privacy from a 
technological and legal standpoint.” 302  Nevertheless, since the 
current legal protections afforded to, for instance, emails sent from 
an employee’s workplace computer are in flux and many such 
emails have been held to be admissible in court proceedings 
despite attorney-client privilege, “a lawyer typically should instruct 
the employee-client to avoid using a workplace device or system 
for sensitive or substantive communications, and perhaps for any 
attorney-client communications[.]”303 This is “because even seemingly 
ministerial communications involving matters such as scheduling 
can have substantive ramifications.”304 
A parallel may be drawn herein: As is the case with regards to 
the uncertain and fluctuating legal protections pertaining to 
workplace emails, attorneys are now similarly faced with an 
unregulated data collection industry to which the applicable laws, 
                                                
300 See id. at R. 1.6(a) (stating that a lawyer must safeguard “information 
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent”). 
301 See id. at R. 1.1. 
302 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011) 
(citing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 
(1999)). 
303 ABA Formal Op. 11-459. 
304 Id. 
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to the extent there are any, are uncertain and in tremendous flux. 
The 2011 opinion errs on the side of caution, advising clients to 
avoid using workplace email accounts because the risk of 
information contained in such accounts being used to the 
advantage of an adversary is unacceptably high. The same logic 
applies with equal force to the personal data that most consumers 
freely surrender into the digital sphere each day. 
Attorneys are hardly failing to recognize the potential value of 
information that can be accessed through online investigation and 
analysis, including the utilization of major data brokers. 
Practitioners have published articles offering advice and insight as 
to the effective use of search engines, social networking sites—in 
both civil and criminal proceedings—blogs, online court records, 
and personal data brokers, such as Intelius, as part of a 
comprehensive informal discovery strategy.305 Bar associations have 
begun offering CLE programs with titles such as “Cybersleuth’s 
Guide to the Internet,” in which one of the covered topics was “the 
advantages (and limitations) of [using] fee-based data broker 
databases to create dossiers about your subject.”306 It has also been 
suggested that there is an affirmative obligation for attorneys to 
inquire into social networking information that may hold potential 
relevance in a given matter.307 Already on the cutting edge of 
providing advanced data-mining technologies to litigators, LexisNexis 
offers products that promise to aid litigants to “get to the right 
                                                
305  See generally Todd B. Baker, The Internet and the Law: Informal 
Discovery on the Internet, 52 THE ADVOCATE 23 (2010); see also Steven C. 
Bennett, Symposium: Ethical Limitations on Informal Discovery of Social Media 
Information, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473, 500-02 (2013); Craig Ball, 
Cybersleuthing for People Who Still Can’t Program Their VCRs, 20 GPSOLO 
40, 45 (2003) (“Literally hundreds of data brokers sell their services online, 
ranging from law-abiding corporate behemoths like Choice-Point and Experian 
to fly-by-night outfits on both sides of the law.”).  
306 See Continuing Legal Education: Cybersleuth’s Guide to the Internet, 
KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, https://www.kcba.org/cle/pdf/212-Brochure.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2015). 
307 Steven C. Bennett, Ethical Limitations on Informal Discovery of Social 
Media Information, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473, 478 (2013). 
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decisions sooner with in-depth judge profiles,”308 “sharpen ongoing 
case strategy and manage client expectations informed by the 
comprehensive collection of data on experts, judges and attorneys[,]”309 
and “[u]tilize the largest, most comprehensive collection of jury 
verdicts and settlements available online . . . to evaluate risk and 
opportunity, gain insight into potential outcomes and determine an 
initial course of action.”310 In short, the tools of computer-assisted 
data mining and analysis are already being put to work in the legal 
world, as are people search products and other data broker services. 
The ABA, for its part, thus far seems to generally sanction the 
practice of delving into one’s digital footprint in the course of 
litigation. A recently released ethics opinion addressed the ethical 
issues that arise when attempting to investigate a juror’s, or 
potential juror’s “internet presence.”311 The opinion concludes that, 
subject to an attorney’s obligations under Rule 3.5(b),312 and Rule 
8.4(a),313 it is permissible to “passively” use websites and social 
media to access publicly available information on jurors, if no 
direct communication between the attorney and the juror takes 
place.314 Thus, the general trend, from an ethical standpoint, seems 
to be one where research on both jurors and litigants in the digital 
sphere is expected, accepted, and, sometimes, obligatory. 
                                                
308 The LexisNexis Litigation Research Portfolio, LEXISNEXIS, http://www. 
lexisnexis.com/en-us/legal-solutions/litigation-portfolio.page (last visited Aug. 
4, 2014). 
309 LexisNexis Litigation Profile Suite, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/ 
en-us/products/lexisnexis-profile-suite.page (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
310 LexisNexis Verdict & Settlement Analyzer, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis. 
com/en-us/products/verdict-and-settlement-analyzer.page (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).  
311 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 14-466 (2014). 
312 See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.5(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . 
communicate ex parte with [a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official] 
unless authorized to do so by law or court order.”). 
313 MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (“It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of 
another.”). 
314 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 14-466 (2014). 
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Even if, lacking systemic protections for personal data, one 
were to simply trust that the intentions and motives of each and 
every member of the data broker industry are ethical and 
benevolent in nature, it must be remembered that these companies 
are still vulnerable to hacking and other scams just like everyone 
else. 315 For instance, in October 2013, the Justice Department 
brought criminal charges against a Vietnamese man who took part 
in the purchase of over 500,000 consumer records from data broker 
Experian, which he then sold to third parties for the purposes of 
identity theft.316 This incident was reminiscent of a similar occurrence 
at ChoicePoint in 2005, wherein ChoicePoint discovered that it had 
been routinely selling personal data dossiers to criminal enterprises 
posing as legitimate businesses. This incident ultimately resulted in 
an FTC settlement wherein ChoicePoint was fined $10 million in 
                                                
315 See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Data Breaches in New York Hit Record High in 
2013, State Attorney General Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/attorney-general-says-new-york-had-
more-than-900-data-breaches-in-2013/; Alastair Jamieson & Erin McClaim, 
Millions of Target Customers’ Credit, Debit Card Accounts May Be Hit by Data 
Breach, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/ 
millions-target-customers-credit-debit-card-accounts-may-be-hit-f2D11775203 
(describing massive data breaches at Target; the 2007 data breach of more than 
45 million customers from T.J. Maxx, Marshalls, and others; the 2011 hack on 
over 100 million Sony Playstation user accounts); Charles Riley, Data Breach in 
UPS Stores in 24 States, CNN (Aug. 21, 2014, 9:39 PM), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2014/08/21/technology/security/ups-store-data-hack/index.html (citing a CNN 
Money analysis which found that fifty percent of Americans were the victims of 
data breaches in a recent twelve month period); Alexis Tsotsis, Employee Data 
Breach the Worst Part of Sony Hack, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/12/16/hack-sony-twice-shame-on-sony/. 
316 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Off. of Public Affairs, Vietnamese 
National Charged in Widespread International Scheme to Steal and Sell 
Hundreds of Thousands of U.S. Persons’ Personally Identifiable Information 
(Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-
crm-1116.html; see also Gil Aegerter, Credit Giant Experian Tangled in ID 
Theft Case, CNBC NEWS (Oct, 24, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101143539#.; 
Letter from Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman of Senate Comm. on 
Commerce, Science and Transp., to Don Robert, CEO of Experian (Oct. 23, 
2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/ 
A_U.S.%20news/US-news-PDFs/experian-commerce-letter.pdf. 
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civil penalties and $5 million in consumer redress.317 Given the 
ubiquity of high profile hacks and data breaches, not to mention 
old-fashioned scams and fraud, the inevitable conclusion is that 
personal data amassed by third-party brokers is never truly safe, 
either from the legal or illegal sale of that data. 
If it is permissible and advisable to consult with clients 
regarding their use of social media due to the potential for such 
uses to adversely affect a client’s position in litigation, it must 
follow that it is equally permissible and advisable to consult with 
clients regarding their daily Internet activities due to the potential 
for such activities to adversely affect a client’s position in 
litigation. Consider the following: there is currently a lack of 
ethical prohibitions on attorneys in terms of conducting research 
on litigants, witnesses, and jurors. Personal information has 
become highly profitable in the context of civil litigation, and the 
data market is essentially unregulated, largely unpredictable, and 
once a keystroke is struck it is stored forever.318 Attorneys should 
view these trends in concert with developments in predictive 
analytic techniques and technologies and the deductions that are 
now possible as a result. In so doing, attorneys must recognize that 
an ethical obligation is arising to both instruct clients as to the 
ramifications of irresponsible Internet usage, as well as to provide, 
at the very least, the resources necessary for clients to prevent the 
dissemination of their information into the digital universe for 
collection, to the extent possible.  
VI.  PROTECTING ONE’S DIGITAL FOOTPRINT—THE BASICS OF 
AVOIDING ONLINE TRACKING 
No single article can serve to provide an all-encompassing 
strategy capable of evading tracking of all activities across all 
servers, platforms, and technologies. Technology today simply 
                                                
317 See Bob Sullivan, Database Giant Gives Access to Fake Firms, NBC 
NEWS (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6969799/ns/technology_ 
and_science-security/t/database-giant-gives-access-fake-firms/#.U-DDyVPLc6A. 
318 See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 22 (stating that some of the largest data 
brokers in the United States “store all data indefinitely”). 
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develops and comes to market too quickly. However, if nothing 
else, this Article is meant to serve predominantly as a wake-up call 
to attorneys that their ethical obligations demand that they stay 
abreast of current technological trends in the area of private digital 
surveillance as well as changes in the law to that effect in order to 
properly advise clients. This will require a concerted effort on the 
part of bar associations across the country to provide relevant 
CLEs that address these issues, as well as an individual effort on 
the part of attorneys to remain up-to-date on technological trends 
and developments to avoid their clients being blindsided in 
litigation. With that caveat, however, there are several technologies 
and practices whose use has been shown to dilute, diminish, or 
disrupt the creation of a person’s digital footprint. Several of these 
are discussed below. 
A. Tor 
Initially developed by the United States Navy’s Naval 
Research Laboratory, first and foremost as a means of protecting 
government communications, Tor (shorthand for “the onion router”) 
is a freely available software and open network that is used 
primarily as a means to mask an Internet user’s identity.319 At the 
time of The Tor Project’s launching in 2002, the focus had shifted 
somewhat from using Tor solely to protect government 
communications to protecting individual users’ web activity from 
the prying eyes of private corporations.320 Today, the Tor Project is 
a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization, based in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, which receives funding from a variety of sources, 
including Google, Human Rights Watch, the Department of 
Defense, and the National Science Foundation.321  
                                                
319 Tor: Overview, THE TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html 
(last visited June 24, 2014); see also Stuart Dredge, What is Tor? A Beginner’s 
Guide to the Privacy Tool, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2013, 7:47 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/05/tor-beginners-guide-nsa-
browser. 
320 Dredge, supra note 319. 
321 Tor People, THE TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/corepeople.html 
(last visited June 24, 2014); Brian Fung, The Feds Pay for 60 Percent of Tor’s 
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Essentially, the Tor software masks a user’s location—and, 
consequently, that user’s identity—by distributing a user’s web 
traffic over several locations across the Internet, funneling one’s 
web activity through multiple relays, thus inhibiting tracking.322 
“Instead of taking a direct route from source to destination, data 
packets on the Tor network take a random pathway through several 
relays that cover your tracks so no observer at any single point can 
tell where the data came from or where it’s going.”323 These relays 
are maintained by series of computers on the Tor network that are 
selected from Tor’s own volunteer-operated network in order to 
disguise the origin and location of information as it is routed 
through the Internet.324 Since Tor disguises a user’s IP address, 
making one’s online activity appear to have originated from the 
Tor network itself, a Tor user is, subject to some exceptions,325 able 
to operate on the Internet without being tracked.326 This freedom 
                                                                                                         
Development. Can Users Trust It?, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/06/the-feds-pays-for-60-percent-
of-tors-development-can-users-trust-it/; see also Keith D. Watson, Note: The 
Tor Network: A Global Inquiry Into the Legal Status of Anonymity Networks, 11 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 715, 718 (2012); see also THE TOR PROJECT, 
INC. AND AFFILIATE CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND REPORTS 
REQUIRED FOR AUDITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH GOVERNMENT AUDITING 
STANDARDS AND OMB CIRCULAR A-133 (Dec. 31, 2013), available at https:// 
www.torproject.org/about/findoc/2013-TorProject-FinancialStatements.pdf. 
322 Tor: Overview, supra note 319. 
323 Id. 
324 Warwick Ashford, Growing Call for Anonymity Online, Says Cambridge 
Researcher, COMPUTER WEEKLY (June 20, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www. 
computerweekly.com/news/2240223087/Growing-call-for-anonymity-online-says-
Cambridge-researcher. 
325 See, e.g., SSD Project EFF: “Surveillance ‘Self-Defence Guide’ to ‘Survive 
and Defend’ Your Civil Liberties’ Online,” ACE NEWS GROUP (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://acenewsservices.com/2014/01/23/ssd-project-eff-surveillance-self-defence-
guide-to-survive-and-defend-your-civil-liberties-on-line/ (noting that Tor alone 
will not defend against malware, and may not be completely successful against 
extremely “resourceful and determined opponents” who have the means and the 
wherewithal to monitor one’s activities at multiple places simultaneously). 
326 See Stephanie K. Pell, Jonesing for a Privacy Mandate, Getting a Technology 
Fix—Doctrine to Follow, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 489, 525–26 (2013) (“Tor is an 
‘onion routing’ technology which hides a user’s IP address, making it appear to 
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applies to both the contents of a message itself as well as a user’s 
metadata.327 There are a select few ways for law enforcement 
agencies and other dedicated and sophisticated digital trackers to 
unmask a user’s identity, particularly if that user is less than 
scrupulous in terms of maintaining a certain degree of what might 
be termed “anonymity discipline” with regard to the use of certain 
unmasking programs and applications such as Flash player.328 Even 
so, the consensus at present seems to be that, even in the face of 
governmental surveillance, let alone private sector tracking, Tor 
successfully protects anonymity for most people most of the 
time.329 
                                                                                                         
originate from a Tor server rather than the actual address from which the user is 
connecting to the Internet”). As with all technologies, however, the efficacy of 
the security and anonymity offered by Tor must be regularly monitored, as both 
governments at home and abroad, as well as researchers and scholars, are 
constantly attempting to penetrate the anonymity network. See James Ball, et al., 
NSA and GCHQ Target Tor Network That Protects Anonymity of Web Users, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/ 
04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption. See also Ilya Khrennikov, Putin Sets 
$110,000 Bounty for Cracking Tor as Anonymous Internet Usage in Russia Surges, 
BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2014, 11:37 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
07-29/putin-sets-110-000-bounty-for-cracking-tor-as-anonymous-internet-usage-
in-russia-surges.html. Furthermore, two researchers at Carnegie Mellon University 
Software Engineering Institute—funded primarily by the U.S. Department of 
Defense—recently backed out of a talk they were set to give at the Black Hat 
security conference. The researchers had claimed that they had figured out how 
to hack Tor to ascertain users’ identities. It remains an open question whether 
the security holes have since been patched. See Joseph Menn & Jim Finkle, 
Internet Privacy Service Tor Warns Users It was Attacked, REUTERS (July 30, 
2014, 6:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/30/us-privacy-software-
attack-idUSKBN0FZ1RZ20140730; see also Tor Security Advisory: “Relay Early” 
Traffic Confirmation Attack, THE TOR PROJECT (July 30, 2014), https://blog. 
torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack. 
327 Pell, supra note 326, at 526–27.  
328 See, e.g., Kevin Poulsen, The FBI Used the Web’s Favorite Hacking Tool 
to Unmask Tor Users, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/ 
2014/12/fbi-metasploit-tor/. 
329 See, e.g., Allistair Charlton, Snowden Files Reveal NSA Had “Major Problems” 
Tracking Tor Dark Web Users and Cracking Encryption, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 
29, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/snowden-files-reveal-nsa-had-major-
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Anonymous browsing has myriad applications. The Tor 
website, for instance, divides its user base into “family and 
friends,” “businesses,” “activists,” “media,” and “military and law 
enforcement.”330 Although anonymous browsing obviously draws a 
criminal element seeking to mask online illegal activities, Tor has 
also found multitudes of users across the globe in countries like 
Turkey, Egypt, Russia, and China due to increased censorship and 
surveillance.331 Similarly, Tor recently rose in use among Iraqis in 
the wake of the Nouri al-Maliki administration’s order to ISPs to 
block social media and news website access within the country.332 
Domestically, in addition to being employed as a tool to prevent 
either private or public sector tracking, it has also been used by 
victims of cyberstalking as a means to evade being tracked.333 
As a practical matter, technical wizardry is not required to 
achieve anonymous browsing. While a user may not be 
invulnerable to certain sophisticated attacks if the full might of a 
governmental agency has been devoted to tracking an individual, 
anonymous browsing software should nevertheless be sufficient to 
prevent the perpetual accumulation of personal data described 
herein in most instances. Access to the Tor network, for instance, 
is most easily achieved through the downloading and use of the 
Tor Browser Bundle, available at the Tor Project’s website.334 The 
                                                                                                         
problems-tracking-tor-dark-web-users-cracking-encryption-1481225; see also supra 
note 326 and accompanying text. 
330 Tor, THE TOR PROJECT, http://www.torproject.com (last visited July 16, 2014). 
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333 Meghan Neal, Tor Is Being Used as a Safe Haven for Victims of Cyberstalking, 
MOTHERBOARD (May 9, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.motherboard.vice.com/ 
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334 See Timothy B. Lee, Five Ways to Stop the NSA From Spying on You, 
WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ 
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as an essential component of any anti-tracking strategy, as well as describing the 
ease of installing and using the Tor Browser Bundle); What is the Tor Browser?, 
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browser itself, a modified version of the Firefox browser, is no 
more difficult to use than other browsers, such as Chrome, 
Explorer, or Safari, to which most Internet users have become 
accustomed.335  
Another method, recently developed by a company called 
Pogoplug, involves the use of a product called Safeplug, which 
allows users to directly access the benefits of Tor by plugging the 
Safeplug into their home router.336 Safeplug acts as a proxy server, 
and allows users to use their preferred browsers and still take 
advantage of the anonymity benefits of the Tor network.337 There is 
also an application available for mobile phone browsing for 
Android operating systems called Orbot that permits users to 
browse anonymously from their mobile phones.338 
The downside, however, is that currently the Tor network is 
likely slower than the browsing speed to which most American 
consumers have become accustomed.339 This is a result of the 
repeated relaying of information through multiple points around 
the Internet before arriving at its destination.340 The upside is that 
the more users that get on the Tor network and volunteer to relay 
                                                                                                         
THE TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html (last visited 
Jun. 25, 2014). 
335 What is the Tor Browser?, supra note 334; see also Jason Kennedy, How 
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(describing Anonabox, a similar device that further encrypts a user’s Internet 
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android.html.en (last visited Jun. 25, 2014) (describing Orbot); see also 
DRAWBRIDGE supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
339 See Tor FAQ: Why Is Tor So Slow?, THE TOR PROJECT, https://www. 
torproject.org/docs/faq (last visited Jun. 25, 2014). 
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traffic for others, the faster the network becomes.341 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, in the year following Edward Snowden’s leaks 
regarding the National Security Agency’s online spying programs, 
reports have indicated that the Tor software has been downloaded 
approximately 120 million times, and this increase in users could 
help limit the speed issues currently facing the Tor network.342 
B. Non-Tracking Search Engines 
In a largely unregulated industry in which personal data 
collection, sale, and analysis are profitable, the best protection is to 
prevent information—any information—about one’s self from 
being collected in the first place. Regular Tor usage is a big step in 
that direction. Another such step is use of a search engine whose 
own policies do not permit the logging and recording of search 
queries and user information. 
Most major search engines constantly collect and store user 
information, including search queries, IP addresses, device information, 
and the like during usage.343 However, in recent years privacy 
advocates have suggested the usage of so-called “non-tracking” 
search engines as part of an overall privacy strategy.344 For instance, 
                                                
341 Id. 
342 Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tor Internet Privacy Tool Sees Downloads Jump 
to 120 Million, DAILY DOT (June 2, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/ 
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Center, YAHOO, https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/ (last updated Sept. 25, 
2014) (stating that “Yahoo automatically receives and records information from 
your computer and browser, including your IP address Yahoo cookie 
information, software and hardware attributes, and the page you request”).  
344 See, e.g., Kate Murphy, How to Muddy Your Tracks on the Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/technology/personaltech/ 
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non-tracking search engine DuckDuckGo.com explicitly states that it 
“does not collect or share personal information. That is our privacy 
policy in a nutshell.”345 By conducting all searches using a non-
tracking search engine, users can greatly reduce the amount of 
information available for collection, aggregation, sale to data 
brokers or other third parties, subpoena, or potential loss due to 
hacking attacks, security holes or technical incompetence. In the 
wake of increased public awareness of both corporate and 
governmental tracking of online activities, DuckDuckGo has 
experienced continuous and steady growth since its inception, and 
as of January 2014 was averaging upwards of four million queries 
per day.346 
C. Do Not Track & Private Browser Settings 
The DNT concept began gaining traction in late 2010 when the 
FTC issued recommendations for the creation and implementation 
of a mechanism somewhat akin to a “do not call” list for the 
Internet.347 Initially, DNT was conceived as a means to empower 
users to control the degree to which first- and third-party websites 
may monitor their online activity through the use of easy-to-use 
browser settings that, when enabled, were capable of either 
blocking third-party cookies by default or sending a signal to 
websites that the user prefers not to be tracked.348 For instance, 
when a user activates the DNT feature in Firefox, Firefox then 
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347 See 2010 FTC REPORT, supra note 39, at 10–11. 
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conveys this message to every website visited, including 
advertisers.349   
As previously touched upon above, however, this initiative has 
met with limited success primarily due to an unwillingness by 
many to abide by users’ Do Not Track requests or companies’ 
inclusions of provisions within their privacy policies that still 
permit partial tracking in spite of such requests.350 Mozilla, for 
example, candidly notes that whether websites honor these 
requests or not is voluntary.351 Moreover, the Digital Advertising 
Alliance (“DAA”), a “self-regulatory body that develops industry 
best practices and effective solutions for consumer choice in online 
behavioral advertising,”352 recently withdrew its support of the 
DNT initiative, leaving this practice’s continued utility further in 
question.353   
While there has been some legislative push to make respecting 
a consumer’s DNT request a mandatory requirement, this effort 
has received little traction in Congress. 354  Absent widespread 
respect for consumers’ DNT requests, consumers may choose to 
utilize any one of several widely available extensions such as 
Ghostery, AdBlock, and Disconnect, which permit users to 
exercise some degree of control over which particular entity is 
tracking them on a given website.355 Although certainly not as 
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comprehensive a solution as, for instance, regular Tor usage, these 
add-ons can be added to a user’s web browser to limit ad tracking 
and block online ads. Ghostery, for instance, states that it is 
functionally “different than opting-out or blocking cookies because 
those strategies still allow the browser to communicate with the 
web service . . . . When blocking is enabled, Ghostery never allows 
the communication in the first place.”356 
D. Non-Scanning Email Services 
As some are now aware, it is not uncommon for some of the 
largest email providers to process the contents of email 
communications in order to more effectively tailor advertisements 
directed at specific users.357 For instance, Google’s terms of service 
states, “Our automated systems analyze your content (including 
emails) to provide you personally relevant product features, such 
as customized search results, tailored advertising, and spam and 
malware detection. This analysis occurs as the content is sent, 
received, and when it is stored.”358 This practice has already been 
the subject of ongoing litigation, as well as no small amount of 
ethical head-scratching by attorneys, although the general 
consensus now seems to be that these services are acceptable, at 
least from a confidentiality standpoint, provided that no human 
beings are actually reviewing emails.359 However, now that Google 
has recently opened the door to scanning users’ email accounts for 
evidence of criminal activity and turning these findings over to law 
enforcement, an additional, more direct incentive exists to close 
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357 See, e.g., In re Google, Inc., Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-2430-LHK, 2014 
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down any email accounts with companies whose privacy policies 
permit the regular scanning of emails.360 
Erring on the side of caution, presuming both that it cannot be 
said with any certainty to what uses one’s stored data will be put in 
the future, and that, as a result, the ultimate goal is to limit the total 
amount of one’s personal data being collected and stored by the 
data collection industry, it is advisable to forgo using email 
services which employ scanning protocols as a matter of course. In 
place of such services, lesser-known free services such as 
HushMail,361 RiseUp,362 and Zoho363 have been promoted by some 
privacy advocates.364 RiseUp’s privacy policy, for instance, states, 
“Our commitment is to keep as little data on you as we can. Unlike 
corporate providers, we do not log internet addresses of anyone 
using riseup.net services, including email.”365 Another option is the 
registration of a unique domain with an associated email address 
through services such as Hover or BlueHost.366 A soon to be 
available addition to the growing list of privacy oriented email 
providers is Dark Mail, offered by the Dark Mail Technical 
Alliance. 367  Although billed primarily as a means to evade 
government snooping in light of recent disclosures regarding 
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ongoing domestic NSA surveillance, Dark Mail offers standard 
encryption to email content, while also taking the unusual step of 
encrypting an email’s metadata.368   
E. Smartphones 
Approximately ninety percent of American adults own a 
cellular phone as of January 2014.369 Of those, two-thirds use their 
phones to access the Internet, and the total number has doubled 
since 2009.370 January 2014 also marked the first time that mobile 
devices have accounted for a majority of the total Internet usage in 
the United States.371 Given this consumer climate, it should not be 
surprising that companies have formed alliances that are dedicated 
to aiding private sector entities in the linking of consumers’ 
computers to their mobile devices to better facilitate data collection 
and targeted advertising. 372  This phenomenon, combined with 
recent increases in some consumers’ privacy sensitivity due to 
revelations regarding both government domestic spying programs 
and private sector data collection have given rise to new, 
market-driven technological innovations in cellular technology. 
For example, in 2014, Apple and Google developed iOS and 
Android operating system versions, respectively, with encryption 
that does not permit the companies to unlock the smartphones at 
the behest of law enforcement, even upon the receipt of a court 
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order to do so. 373  However, in the realm of cellular privacy, 
Blackphone reigns supreme, at least for the time being. 
Self-described as “the product of the best privacy minds in the 
industry,” the Blackphone utilizes PrivatOS, an Android based 
operating system combined with a number of unique security 
measures designed to prevent data collection and government 
snooping.374 Because the device employs no Google services due to 
Google’s failure to endorse PrivatOS, Blackphone will certainly 
feel somewhat foreign initially. However, early reviews have been 
generally positive due to unique privacy features, which, for 
instance, permit users to select specific permissions for 
downloaded apps and keep such permissions turned off by 
default.375 The phone also has remote wiping functions and secure 
search, browsing, voice, video, and text functions.376 Although it 
currently comes with a hefty price tag north of six hundred dollars, 
and thus may only be attractive in the immediate future to those in 
sensitive corporate or government positions or those who are 
uniquely privacy-oriented, the general consensus thus far seems to 
be that Blackphone lives up to the hype. As one tech writer 
recently put it, “If data has value, so, apparently, does protecting 
it.”377 
                                                
373 See, e.g., Craig Timberg et al., FBI Blasts Apple, Google for Locking 
Police Out of Phones, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
technology/2014/09/25/68c4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html. 
374 BLACK PHONE, https://www.blackphone.ch (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
375 See Molly Wood, A Smartphone for Consumers Who Want Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/technology/personaltech/ 
review-blackphone-trades-some-convenience-for-security.html?_r=0; Nate Lanxon, 
Don’t Call It ‘NSA-Proof’: Blackphone is Here (Hands-on), WIRED (Feb. 24, 
2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/24/blackphone-hands-on. 
376 BLACK PHONE, https://www.blackphone.ch (last visited Aug. 7, 2014); see 
also Natasha Lomas, Blackphone Confirms Privacy-Focused App Store and 
Device Sandboxes Incoming, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 9, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/ 
2014/12/09/blackphone-confirms-privacy-focused-app-store-and-device-
sandboxes-incoming/. 
377 Hugh Langley, Hands On: BlackPhone Review, TECH RADAR (Feb. 26, 
2014), http://www.techradar.com/us/reviews/phones/mobile-phones/blackphone-
1228305/review. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, prior to Facebook’s meteoric 
rise and ensuing cultural ubiquity, had the legal profession been 
able to foresee that every tagged drunken spring break photo, 
2:00 AM status update, and furious wall post would one day be 
vulnerable to potential exposure in the cold, unforgiving light of 
civil and criminal litigation, attorneys would have been 
well-advised to discuss the ramifications of such actions, 
statements, and disclosures with their clients. This Article posits 
that another similar phenomenon is looming in the form of data 
collection, aggregation, analysis, and sale,378 and that it will be the 
prudent attorney who competently advises his clients to stay ahead 
of the curve.  
This Article is meant to take no position on the obvious Fourth 
Amendment implications of felon-identifying programs,379 nor is it 
meant to be a thorough analytical critique of the shortcomings of 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, or the notice and 
consent model. Nor is it meant to be an indictment of the data 
broker industry generally. No one should be surprised when an 
industry engages in practices that are profitable, innovative, and 
legal. This Article does, however, suggest that, given the 
foregoing, the most prudent course of action is one that is 
farsighted and includes the development of comprehensive 
strategies designed to maximize privacy and limit the amount of 
clients’ personal data that flows out into the world. This is due to 
two simple realities: (1) the more one person knows about another, 
the easier it is for the information holder to manipulate that person 
and demand their obedience, and (2) everyone’s information is for 
sale. 
  
                                                
378 See, e.g., Martha Neil, Selfies Posted Online Are Being Mass-Scanned for 
Marketing Insights, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/selfies_posted_online_are_being_mass_scanned_for_marketing_ins
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379 See, e.g., Robertson, supra notes 159 and accompanying text. 
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